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I. INTRODUCTION
IThe decisional law in the [double jeopardy] area is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator. '
The decisional law of double jeopardy has become even more entangled
than it was a dozen years ago when then Justice Rehnquist penned his
metaphor.2 The language of the Double Jeopardy Clause is straightforward
1. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
2. For example, at the end of the October 1992 term, by a vote of five-to-four, the
Court overturned the three-year-old same-conduct test for determining whether two
offenses are really the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. United States v.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)). Yet,
when the Dixon Court applied the earlier same-elements test for same offense, the
majority split three-to-two, with Chief Justice Rehnquist accusing the two of using an
[Vol. 44:411
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
enough: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."3 Yet, as is true of other clauses of the
Constitution,4 the details of its component parts can be numbingly complex.
Even apparently simple inquiries, such as what is an acquittal, a conviction,
or the same offense, yield no simple responses.
Some of the difficulty may be avoided, however, by focusing carefully
on the precise issue presented in any particular case. For example, the
answer to whether one offense is the same as another may depend in part on
whether the question is asked in the context of successive prosecutions or
in the context of multiple sentences for related charges in a single prosecu-
tion. Cases crucial to determining the issue in the former setting5 may be
irrelevant in the latter, and vice versa.
6
Article I, Section 12 of the South Carolina Constitution closely tracks
the language of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause: "No
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or liberty . . . . "' The only noteworthy differences between the two
clauses are the absence of a reference to liberty in the Fifth Amendment
version and the absence of a reference to jeopardy of limb in South
Carolina's version.8
Because the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause was not
applicable to the states until 1969, 9 state constitutional provisions, statutes,
analysis strikingly similar to that of the overturned same-conduct test. Id. at 2867
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra notes 387-397 and
accompanying text.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. For example, the ten words of the Free Speech Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I,
require 300 to 400 pages of explication in a standard introductory constitutional law
casebook. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(9th ed. 1993).
5. See infra notes 324-348 and accompanying text (discussing Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993)).
6. See infra notes 286-289 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359 (1983)).
7. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
8. This is an interesting omission given that at least some mutilation, such as
cropping ears, was an authorized punishment in slave courts in colonial times. See
WILLIAM R. SMITH, SOUTH CAROLINA AS A ROYAL PROVINCE 143 (1970). South
Carolina's double jeopardy clause first appeared in the Constitution of 1868 as Article
I, Section 18. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 18. Currently, the South Carolina
Constitution explicitly proscribes corporal, as well as cruel or unusual, punishment. S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 15.
9. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The applicability of the selective
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and common law provided the bulk of the protection from double jeopardy
for most of the country's history. While many of the post-1969 South
Carolina double jeopardy cases appear to rely exclusively on federal law,'°
others continue to reflect the importance of local provisions." As in any
other area of criminal procedure, knowledge of state law is crucial to
understanding the protection from double jeopardy.
The purpose of this Article is to facilitate understanding by providing
as clear as possible a chart through the difficult waters of double jeopardy.
The author dissects the pertinent issues, not with the detail of a treatise,"2
but with an eye toward simple explication. Although the emphasis of this
Article is on federal law, the analysis is complemented, where appropriate,
by discussion of local provisions.
II. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. History and Policies
Despite at least one court's assertion to the contrary, 3 the history of
the protection from double jeopardy cannot be traced to the Magna Charta,
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, nor any English statute prior to 1791 ."
While the origin of double jeopardy protection might be found in early
Roman or canon law,"' and it may have appeared in embryonic form in
England in the fourteenth century,' 6 by the seventeenth century the basic
modem rule against double jeopardy was well established and encompassed
within the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, autrefois
attaint (literally, other times acquitted, convicted, or attainted-i.e., had
one's goods declared forfeited), and former pardon. '7 The basic English
10. E.g., Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258 (1990), discussed infra
notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., State v. Clarke, 302 S.C. 423,396 S.E.2d 827 (1990), discussed infra notes
443-444 and accompanying text.
12. The author is unaware of a treatise on double jeopardy. The subject is explored
in some detail in 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ch. 24 (1985). For discussion of history and policy issues, see JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY (1969). LEONARD G. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1968), critiques only the dual sovereignty cases. Recent federal cases on a range of
double jeopardy issues are discussed in Laura P. Clauson et al., Project, Twenty-First
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals, 1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1294-1340 (1992).
13. State v. Felch, 105 A. 23, 26 (Vt. 1918) (cited in SIGLER, supra note 12, at 4).
14. SIGLER, supra note 12, at 4.
15. id. at 3-4.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id. at 18-19. Some early twentieth-century cases distinguished, and entertained,
[Vol. 44:411
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common-law protections were well known to colonial lawyers through
Coke's Institutes8 and Blackstone's Commentaries. 9
The general circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Bill of
Rights have been explored in great detail,' and the antecedents of some
of its more celebrated provisions, such as the Establishment Clause,2' are
well known.' However, the pedigree of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
more obscure.
'Colonial legislative protection from double jeopardy first appeared in
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641: "No man shall be twise
sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or
Trespasse."2 The Massachusetts law, which served as a model for other
colonies, represented a substantial expansion of the scope of protection
available under English common law. In the colonies, all crimes, not just
capital felonies, were covered.24 Although protection from double jeopardy
was recognized in the law of the colonies, only two state constitutions had
double jeopardy provisions when the Bill of Rights was adopted.'5
Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Green v. United States,26
and Professor Sigler trace the sketchy history of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's precise language from Madison's original proposal to its final
separate pleas for autrefois acquit and former jeopardy. E.g., State v. Gowan, 178 S.C.
78, 80-82, 182 S.E. 159, 160-61 (1935). Although the common-law pleas are still
available, a claim of double jeopardy pursuant to federal and state constitutional provi-
sions covers the issues raised in the common-law pleas. Modem practice seems to rely
only on constitutional claims. E.g., State v. Magazine, 302 S.C. 55, 393 S.E.2d 385
(1990). Unfortunately, Magazine is also an example of another common practice, which
is to ignore the state constitution.
18. EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 213-14 (1648).
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335-37
(13th ed. 1880). The influence of this passage in Blackstone on those who adopted the
Constitution is noted in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1955).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
23. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 43 (William H. Whitmore ed., 1889).
24. SIGLER, supra note 12, at 21-22.
25. Id. at 23-27. The first provision, enacted in New Hampshire, was limited to
instances of prior acquittal: "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for
the same crime or offence." N.H. CONST. art. I, § XVI, quoted in SIGLER, supra note
12, at 23. The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1790 used language virtually
identical to the Fifth Amendment, which was adopted the following year: "No person
shall, for the same offence, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." PA. CONST. art.
IX, § 10, quoted in SIGLER, supra note 12, at 23.
26. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,201-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1993]
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form. Little contemporaneous evidence of the Clause's intended meaning
exists other than the statement that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended
to be "declaratory of the law as it now stood,'27 referring to the "universal
practice in Great Britain and in this country."28 However, the language
chosen by the Framers quite clearly suggests a broader scope for the
protection than that which prevailed in Great Britain. The language of the
Fifth Amendment, like that of the Massachusetts Body of Liberty,29 is not
limited to capital felonies; nor is it limited to instances in which the accused
had been previously acquitted or convicted-limitations inherent in the
common-law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict."
The record of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is much more accessible than the history of the Clause's
origin. According to United States v. DiFrancesco3' the Clause's guarantee
consists "'of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense.'"32 Furthermore, as a'
fourth guarantee, "the constitutional protection also embraces the defend-
ant's 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.'""
The basic rationale for the Double Jeopardy Clause, and particularly for
proscribing reprosecution following acquittal, is
"that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty."
3 4
When the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, it was considered a
necessary limitation on the powers of the newly created federal government,
but was not applicable to actions of the states or their political subdivi-
27. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 753 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
28. Id.
29. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 23, at 43.
30. Because the Fifth Amendment's language does not limit its applicability to prior
convictions or acquittals, the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to trials following
mistrials. See infra Part VI.
31. 449 U.S. 117, 126-38 (1980).
32. Id. at 129 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
33. Id. at 128 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (citations
omitted)).
34. Id. at 127-28 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
[Vol. 44:411
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sions.35 With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, howev-
er, the states subjected their judicial proceedings to federal scrutiny for
compliance with the federal Due Process Clause. In the half century from
1920 to 1970, most of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights were held
to be essential to due process and were incorporated via the Fourteenth
Amendment to be applicable to the states.36
The Double Jeopardy Clause was a latecomer to the process of selective
incorporation, not made applicable to the states until the 1969 case of
Benton v. Maryland.37 In Benton the Court stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against double jeopardy was "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice. "
3
1
By that date, South Carolina had provided similar protection in its
constitution for over a century, and in its common law for a much longer
time. 39 The South Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided: "No person,
after having been once acquitted by a jury, shall again, for the same offense,
be put in jeopardy of his life or liberty."40 Although this clause of the
South Carolina Constitution expanded the common-law double jeopardy
protection from capital offenses to all offenses,4 it retained the limitation
35. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
36. The selective incorporation doctrine represents a compromise between Justice
Black's position that the Due Process Clause totally incorporates the Bill of Rights, and
Justice Frankfurter's opposite view that the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the
Bill of Rights at all. The history and controversy about the doctrine is summarized in
Justice Black's concurring opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-71 (1968)
(Black, J., concurring), and in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, id. at 171-93 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
37. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
38. Benton, 395 U.S. at 796. The Court's thumbnail sketch of the history of double
jeopardy law, id. at 795, relied heavily on SIGLER, supra note 12, which was published
the same year, 1969.
On one occasion three members of the Court suggested that not every aspect of
Fifth Amendment double jeopardy law is applicable to the states. Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S. 28, 40 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("All, and every part, of the
common law of England, where it is not altered by the Code or inconsistent with the
Constitution or laws of this State, is hereby continued in full force and effect in the same
manner as before the adoption of this section."). This section can be traced to the early
eighteenth century. Act of Dec. 12, 1712, No. 322, § 5, 2 S.C. Stat. 401, 413-14
(1837). One of the earliest reported common-law cases, State v. Wright, 7 S.C.L. (2
Tread.) 517 (1814), concluded that the protection against double jeopardy precluded a
new trial for one acquitted of a misdemeanor, even though contrary to the evidence. Id.
at 519.
40. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 18.
41. The applicability to misdemeanors of the common-law rule against retrial after
1993]
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on the protection to instances in which the accused had been previously
acquitted. 42 The limitation to acquittals disappeared with the constitution
of 1895: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or liberty." 4" The language was slightly modified in
1971 to its present form: "No person shall be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty . . .. 4
South Carolina double jeopardy cases prior to Benton v. Maryland
necessarily applied only state constitutional, statutory, and common-law
provisions. However, the state's courts often looked to decisions of the
United States Supreme Court for guidance in developing the common
law.45 Post-Benton South Carolina cases typically cite both state and federal
constitutional provisions, but discuss the double jeopardy issue without
distinguishing state law from federal law. 46 There is no inherent reason
why South Carolina's double jeopardy clause should have the same meaning
as the Fifth Amendment's, but since Benton the South Carolina courts have
never interpreted the state provision independently of its federal counter-
part.
47
B. When Jeopardy Attaches and Terminates, and
Continuing Jeopardy
Not all double jeopardy issues are complicated. Some are quite
straightforward, such as those concerning the beginning (though perhaps not
the termination) of jeopardy. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury
acquittal had been settled in South Carolina for more than half a century by the time the
state constitution was adopted. See Wright, 7 S.C.L. (2 Tread.) at 519.
42. This limitation was similar to that in the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784,
see supra note 25.
43. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. I, § 17 (current version at S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12).
44. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
45. See, e.g., State v. Gathers, 15 S.C. 370, 371-72 (1881) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. V; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); and South Carolina and
British precedent).
46. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 274 S.C. 613, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980). Sometimes South
Carolina cases simply refer to the "double jeopardy clause" without specifying either
state or federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Magazine, 302 S.C. 55, 57, 393 S.E.2d
385, 386 (1990).
47. Research reveals 51 reported South Carolina cases since Benton that mention
double or former jeopardy, beginning with State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 175 S.E.2d 227
(1970). Cases that explicitly refer to South Carolina's double jeopardy clause in the main
opinion are: State v. Dobson, 279 S.C. 551, 309 S.E.2d 752 (1983); State v. Lawson,
279 S.C. 266, 305 S.E.2d 249 (1983); State v. Prince, 279 S.C. 30, 301 S.E.2d 471
(1983); Kelly v. State, 274 S.C. 613, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980); and State v. Kirby, 269
S.C. 25, 236 S.E.2d 33 (1977).
[Vol. 44:411
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is sworn.48 In a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the first witness is
sworn.49 And, in a case resolved by a guilty plea, jeopardy attaches when
the plea is accepted." Jeopardy attaches in juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tions when the court begins to hear the evidence. 1
Whether jeopardy has attached is significant because events occurring
before that time, such as dismissal of the indictment, will not preclude a
subsequent proceeding. 2 After jeopardy has attached, however, dismissal
of the indictment or a failure to prosecute a charge will preclude future
prosecution. 3 Mistrials declared after jeopardy has attached may or may
not preclude subsequent prosecution. 4 This aspect of double jeopardy
jurisprudence represents a substantial departure from the traditional, and
current, British rule that only a prior acquittal or conviction precludes
subsequent prosecution.5
In United States v. BallP6 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
validity of the traditional British rule that jeopardy does not attach if the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to try the case.5 7 However, the Court concluded
that a fatally defective indictment does not deprive a court of jurisdiction in
the requisite sense; therefore, an acquittal on that indictment will preclude
subsequent prosecution as long as "the court had jurisdiction of the cause
and of the party.""
Repeated references to jurisdiction in the later double jeopardy case of
Kepner v. United States59 suggest that jeopardy will attach as long as the
court is competent to try the accused and the crime.' Conversely, a recent
48. E.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978) (citing Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963)); State v. Rogers, 263 S.C. 373, 383,210 S.E.2d 604, 609 (1974);
State v. Charles, 183 S.C. 188, 193-94, 190 S.E. 466, 468 (1937).
49. E.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
50. E.g., United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 967 (1978).
51. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975).
52. See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 389.
53. See Kelly v. State, 274 S.C. 613, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980). The solicitor in Kelly
prosecuted only one charge in a three-count indictment, but, because jeopardy attached
to the entire indictment when the jury was sworn, the other charges could not be pursued
in a subsequent proceeding. However, not every dismissal after jeopardy has attached
necessarily precludes subsequentproceedings. See infra notes 180-183 and accompanying
text.
54. See discussion infra part VI.A.
55. See SIGLER, supra note 12, at 126-28.
56. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
57. Id. at 669.
58. Id. at 669-70.
59. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
60. Id. at 133. For example, until July 9, 1992 a magistrate's court in South Carolina
1993]
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lower court case suggests that a fatally defective indictment might deprive
a court of jurisdiction to the extent that jeopardy would not attach in its
proceedings.6'
The termination of jeopardy is a more complex issue than the attach-
ment of jeopardy. The concept of "continuing jeopardy" permits reprosecu-
tion if jeopardy has not been terminated in the first trial by acquittal or
conviction.62 For example, "the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not
an event which terminates jeopardy. "63 Consequently, a subsequent
prosecution on that indictment does not implicate double jeopardy; it is
simply a continuation of the original jeopardy. On the other hand, a mistrial
declared over the defendant's objection will terminate jeopardy unless the
mistrial was required by manifest necessity.64
In State v. Gambles the South Carolina Supreme Court used some
confusing language in correctly concluding that a mistrial granted for
manifest necessity does not preclude reprosecution. Instead of referring to
continuing jeopardy, the Gamble court observed that "jeopardy did not
attach in the first trial because the mistrial was the result of manifest
necessity."' Actually, jeopardy attached once the jury was sworn,67 but
was not terminated by the mistrial declared for manifest necessity.
Therefore, the original jeopardy continued through the subsequent prosecu-
tion.
The concept of continuing jeopardy has proved important in the trial de
novo system of appeal. For example, in Justices of Boston Municipal Court
v. Lydon68 the court examined the trial de novo system of Boston, Mas-
sachusetts. Under this system, a person facing certain minor charges in
Boston may first seek a bench trial in municipal court and then, if convicted,
seek a jury trial de novo as of right.69 A trial de novo without judicial
consideration that the prior bench trial conviction should be reversed for a
was not competent to try a criminal offense with a possible punishment greater than 30-
days incarceration or a $200.00 fine. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-545 and -550 (Law. Co-
op. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
61. Schlang v. Heard, 691 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951
(1983).
62. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984).
63. Id. at 325.
64. See infra part VI.C.
65. 275 S.C. 492, 272 S.E.2d 796 (1980) (concluding that manifest necessity was
established because of discovery of biased jurors after the State had begun to present its
case).
66. Id. at 494, 272 S.E.2d at 797.
67. See supra text accompanying note 48.
68. 466 U.S. 294 (1984).
69. Id. at 297.
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lack of sufficient evidence 0 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Lydon jeopardy did not terminate at the conclusion of the first trial, but
continued through the trial de novo.7'
More importantly, continuing jeopardy is now understood to allow a
retrial after reversal of a conviction on appeal or pursuant to collateral
relief.
72
C. Proceedings to Which Double Jeopardy Applies
The language of the Fifth Amendment, "twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,"73 suggests that protection from double jeopardy is limited to
crimes carrying capital or corporal punishment. However, the Court in Ex
parte Lange74 concluded that the protection extends to all criminal offenses.
The Court placed significance on the fact that the common-law pleas of
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict had been made applicable to misde-
meanors as well as to capital felonies.75
Early in the eighteenth century the South Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that the common-law protection against double jeopardy extended
to misdemeanors as well as to felonies.76 The double jeopardy clause in the
South Carolina Constitution of 186811 was similarly interpreted.78
In Breed v. Jones79 the Court recognized that the protection against
double jeopardy also extends beyond felonies and misdemeanors to apply in
juvenile delinquency adjudications, even if labeled "civil." s° The risks
involved in juvenile delinquency determinations, including stigma and loss
of liberty, are sufficiently similar to the risks involved in traditional criminal
70. The Court had previously held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a
subsequent trial when a reviewing court reverses a previous conviction on the same
charge because of insufficient evidence. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978),
discussed infra notes 247-252 and accompanying text.
71. Lydon, 466 U.S. at 309-10.
72. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (commenting on the rule in
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), that retrial following reversal of a conviction
is not double jeopardy). The Ball rule is discussed infra text accompanying note 242.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
75. Id. at 169.
76. State v. Wright, 7 S.C.L. (2 Tread.) 517 (1814). The offense in Wright was
minor: "Indictment for nuisances, by intruding on the streets of York Village, and
building piazzas in front of their dwelling houses." Id. at 517.
77. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 18.
78. State v. Gathers, 15 S.C. 370 (1881).
79. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
80. Id. at 529.
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proceedings to warrant protection from double jeopardy."1 Jeopardy does
not attach, however, at a juvenile certification procedure in which the court
determines only whether the defendant should be tried as a juvenile or an
adult, not whether the juvenile should be adjudicated delinquent. 2
Other adjudications involving stigma and loss of liberty are not deemed
to expose a defendant to jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment sense. Revocation
of probation or parole because of alleged commission of a criminal offense
does not trigger the protection from double jeopardy because the revocation
is administrative rather than criminal in nature. 3 Thus, reliance on Breed
v. Jones in this instance would be misplaced. Similarly, a prison disciplinary
action would not preclude a subsequent criminal action based on the same
conduct. 4
Forfeiture proceedings and civil fines following criminal prosecutions
can raise troublesome double jeopardy issues. In One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States' the Court concluded that statutory forfeiture
provisions, which are neither unreasonable nor excessive, in aid of the tariff
laws are remedial rather than punitive. 6 Consequently, forfeiture provi-
sions that apply to acts of importation without a customs declaration were
not forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though the forfeiture
followed an acquittal on criminal charges for the same act of importationY
"'Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the
same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely
punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the
same offense.'"
88
The difficulty lies in determining whether a sanction labeled "civil" is
81. Id. at 530-31.
82. Guam v. Fejeran, 687 F.2d 302, 303 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1045 (1983). According to Guam law, a certification hearing is distinct from an
adjudicatory hearing. When, at the certification hearing, the juvenile court elects to retain
jurisdiction over the juvenile, a separate hearing is required to determine delinquency.
Id. at 304.
83. E.g., United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1986) (probation); United
States ex reL Carrasquillo v. Thomas, 677 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1982) (parole).
84. Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 570, 266 S.E.2d 779,781 (dictum), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1036 (1980). Also, a prison disciplinary proceeding against an inmate that
could result in forfeiture of early release credits does not expose the inmate to jeopardy.
United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1989); see Clauson, supra note 12,
at 1297 n.1441.
85. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
86. Id. at 237.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
[Vol. 44:411
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/2
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
truly civil or criminal. In United States v. Halper89 a unanimous Court
concluded that, because the imposed civil penalties were clearly punitive
rather than remedial, the penalties were proscribed by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The defendant in Halper, previously convicted of Medicare fraud
on sixty-five false claims amounting to $585.00, had been fined $5000.00
and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Subsequently, the government
sought a civil penalty of $130,000.00, a statutorily set fine of $2000.00 for
each of the sixty-five false claims, even though the false claims involved
only $9.00 each.' The Court concluded that the penalties served the
punitive aims )of retribution or deterrence rather than the remedial aim of
making the government whole. 9 The Court acknowledged, however, that
the Double Jeopardy Clause would not preclude the government from
seeking both full civil and criminal penalties in a single proceeding.'
The Court had previously considered whether contempt sanctions were
civil or criminal in Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock.93 The determination
between civil and criminal contempt depends upon the character of the
sanction actually imposed rather than the underlying purpose of the contempt
proceeding.' The Feiock Court determined that contempt sanctions of fine
or imprisonment are remedial and civil if designed to aid the complain-
ant-i.e., if the fine goes to the complainant and if incarceration would
cease upon compliance with the court's order. On the other hand, the
sanctions are punitive and criminal if designed to vindicate the authority of
the courts-i. e., if the fine is paid to the court and the incarceration is for
a definite period.95
In State v. Magazine96 the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on
Halper and Feiock to conclude that a prior contempt citation was criminal
in nature, thus precluding a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same
act.97 The defendant in Magazine was convicted of assault and battery of
a high and aggravated nature. He had previously been held in contempt of
a family court's protection order for the same assault and sanctioned with
a year's imprisonment, suspended upon the payment of a $1500.00 fine. The
court concluded that the sanction was criminal in nature because the
89. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
90. Id. at 437-38.
91. Id. at 448-49.
92. Id. at 450.
93. 485 U.S. 624 (1988). The Double Jeopardy Clause was not at issue in Feiock.
94. Id. at 631-33.
95. Id. at 631-32.
96. 302 S.C. 55, 393 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
97. Id. at 57-58, 393 S.E.2d at 386-87.
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defendant could not purge the contempt sanction by complying with the
protection order."8
In United States v. Dixon, 9 a significant case decided at the end of the
October 1992 term, the United States Supreme Court held that the protection
of the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to criminal contempt proceed-
ings, at least to those of the non-summary variety. 100 Eight justices agreed
with this conclusion. 01
D. Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
"The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law
conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government.
When a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two
98. Id. at 58, 393 S.E.2d at 386.
99. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Dixon's primary significance lies in the Court's
overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which had established the "same-
conduct" test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy
purposes. See discussion infra part V.B.
100. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856. Summary contempt proceedings impose sanctions for
disruption of judicial process. See State v. Yancy, 4 N.C. 133 (1814). Non-summary
criminal contempt proceedings seek to vindicate the court's authority by sanctioning
failure to comply with its orders. See Hicks ex reL Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624
(1988). The Dixon Court noted that it was not deciding whether the protection from
double jeopardy applies to summary contempt proceedings. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856
n.1. Only Justice Blackmun, who would not apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to any
contempt proceeding, failed to see a relevant distinction between summary and non-
summary contempt proceedings. Id. at 2880-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
101. Justice Scalia's majority opinion on this point (Part 11 of the opinion) was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Dixon, 113
S. Ct. at 2853. Justice White also agreed, joined on this point by Justices Stevens and
Souter. Id. at 2868-69 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
Justice White characterized the majority's treatment of the issue as conclusory and
responded in some detail to the government's arguments. He first rejected the argument
from precedent as not supported. Id. at 2869-70. He found more powerful the
government's argument that injuries to two different interests are at stake: a court's
interest in preserving its authority, via a contempt proceeding, and the public's interest
in being free from harm, served through enforcement of the criminal law. Nonetheless,
he concluded that serving the two interests does not justify ignoring the core Double
Jeopardy Clause protection against successive prosecutions. Id. at 2870-72. Finally, he
rejected the contention that finding double jeopardy protection in a criminal contempt
proceeding would have grave practical consequences. Instead, he suggested that the two
different interests could be served by prosecuting the contempt charge and the criminal
law violation in a single proceeding. Id. at 2872-73.
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sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
'offenses.'"'" If two governmental entities, seeking successively to
prosecute an individual for the same act, draw their authority to punish from
distinct sources of power, then they are separate sovereigns. Therefore, their
successive prosecutions for the same act do not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 3 Consequently, both the federal and state governments may
prosecute a defendant for the same act, 'I regardless of which prosecutes
first, 05 as may two separate states,'I without offending the Fifth Amend-
ment. A Native American nation or tribe and the federal government are
also separate sovereigns for purposes of this doctrine. ' 7
A state and one of its political subdivisions are not, however, separate
sovereigns. Thus, successive prosecutions for the same act by these
governmental units would violate double jeopardy,' as would successive
prosecutions by two or more political subdivisions of a single state."
102. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (citing United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). The dual sovereignty doctrine is critiqued in MILLER, supra note
12.
103. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88.
104. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922). The dual sovereignty doctrine contains a certain irony. The doctrine of
selective incorporation, which makes the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the states,
see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text, depends upon the rationale that by
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment the states surrendered a part of their sovereignty to
the federal government. Yet, the dual sovereignty doctrine maintains that both the states
and the federal government, bound by the same Double Jeopardy Clause because of their
shared sovereignty, are separate sovereigns for purposes of assessing possible violations
of the Clause. Post-Benton dual sovereignty cases appear untroubled by this irony. See,
e.g., Heath, 474 U.S. at 82.
105. In both Lanza and Abbate the state prosecution preceded the federal one. In
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), a companion case to Abbate, the state prosecu-
tion followed acquittal on federal charges for the same act.
106. Heath, 474 U.S. at 89. Conspiracy cases aside, there are probably few instances
in which two states would have jurisdiction to prosecute for the same act. Any state in
which an overt act pursuant to a conspiracy takes place has jurisdiction to prosecute that
conspiracy. See State v. McAdams, 167 S.C. 405, 166 S.E. 405 (1932); WILLIAM S.
MCANINCH & W.G. FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 347 (2d ed.
1989). In Heath the murder victim was kidnapped in Alabama and found dead in
Georgia. The defendant was prosecuted for murder in both states. Heath, 474 U.S. at 83-
85. Heath is critiqued in Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A
Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 801 (1985).
107. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328-30 (1978).
108. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); see State v. Carter, 291 S.C. 385, 353
S.E.2d 875 (1987).
109. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). Section 17-23-20 of the South Carolina
1993]
15
McAninch: Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Even though a state and its political subdivisions are not separate
sovereigns, two situations exist in which each might prosecute for the same
act without implicating double jeopardy. First, a local prosecution would not
bar a subsequent state prosecution for a harm not fully consummated at the
time of the former prosecution. Thus, a local conviction for assault before
the victim died would not preclude a subsequent state homicide prosecu-
tion."' Second, a defendant cannot avoid more serious state charges by
procuring a municipal conviction through collusion between the defendant
and local authorities."'
While successive prosecutions for the same act by separate sovereigns
do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, there are three constraints on
such prosecutions. One, known as the Petite policy, first noted by the
Supreme Court in Petite v. United States,"' is a requirement of the United
States Justice Department that mandates prior approval by the Assistant
Attorney General for federal prosecution following state prosecution for the
same act."' Additionally, the Petite policy allows the federal government
to seek dismissal of a federal indictment or federal conviction." 4 Because
the policy is merely an internal guideline for the federal government,
however, a defendant cannot rely on it while seeking dismissal of an
indictment over the objection of the government. "
5
Second, a state prosecution following a federal prosecution for the same
act, though allowed by Bartkus v. Illinois,"6 may be prohibited by a state
constitution1 7 or statute."' For example, the South Carolina Narcotics
and Controlled Substances Act provides: "If a violation of this article is a
Code explicitly bars trial in another court for the same act previously tried in municipal
or magistrate's court. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
110. Culberson v. Wainwright, 453 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 913
(1972).
111. See, e.g., Weaver v. Schaaf, 520 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1975). In Weaver, because
there was insufficient evidence that local authorities colluded with the defendant and his
attorney on the municipal prosecution, the later state charge was barred. Id. at 64-66.
The Missouri Supreme Court found nothing improper in defense counsel's seeking to
have the local charge brought to trial in order to preclude the later, and more serious,
state charge. Id. at 64.
112. 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (per curiam).
113. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.142 (1990).
114. See Petite, 361 U.S. at 530. The Court later held that it is an abuse of discretion
for a district court to refuse the government's request to vacate a conviction. Rinaldi v.
United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
115. United States v. King, 590 F.2d 253, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 973 (1979).
116. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
117. E.g., People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1976).
118. See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 106, at 823-24 (categorizing such statutes).
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violation of a Federal law or the law of another state, the conviction or
acquittal under Federal law or the law of another state for the same act is
a bar to prosecution in this State."119 At least forty states have related
limitations on successive prosecutions.'"o
The final limitation on multi-sovereign prosecutions precludes federal
authorities from using state prosecution as a tool to avoid the Double
Jeopardy Clause's protection following an acquittal in a previous federal
trial.' In an analogous situation, a lower federal court has held that the
United States Attorney's office must not serve as the state prosecutor's tool
following a failed state effort to convict.22 However, mere cooperation
between state and federal authorities does not preclude successive prosecu-
tions." If the same act violates both state and federal statutes, which each
sovereign has an interest in enforcing, the claim that the prosecution is a
sham to subvert the Double Jeopardy Clause is difficult to prove. 
124
III. REPROSECUTION FOLLOWING ACQUITTAL
A. Basic Rule and Definition of Acquittal
"Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy
jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict of acquittal . .. could not be
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.'" 2 The rationale for this
fundamental rule is that "[t]o permit a second trial after an acquittal,
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-410 (Law. Co-op. 1985). This exception to permissible
prosecutions under the dual sovereignty doctrine is limited to prosecutions under the
Narcotics and Controlled Substances Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-53-110 to -590 (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992). Research reveals no other limitations in South Carolina law
to the dual sovereignty doctrine.
120. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 106, at 824 (citing MILLER, supra note 12, at
109 n.9).
121. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959).
122. United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2009 (1991).
123. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 122-24. The federal investigator in Bartkus turned over
to the state prosecutor evidence gathered both before and after the defendant's acquittal
on federal bank robbery charges. Id. at 122.
124. See id. at 123-24; Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1105-07; see also Clauson, supra note
12, at 1328 n.1558 (discussing Pungitore and related cases).
125. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (alterations
in original) (quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)). The basic double
jeopardy prohibition against reprosecution following acquittal was recognized in South
Carolina during the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 7 S.C.L. (2
Tread.) 517 (1814). This protection is still invoked in South Carolina by the plea of
autrefois acquit. See State v. Dobson, 279 S.C. 551, 309 S.E.2d 752 (1983).
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however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unaccept-
ably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might
wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent, he may be found
guilty.'" 1" The very essence of double jeopardy protection is the protec-
tion from reprosecution following an acquittal.
The Court has long recognized that a jury's verdict of not guilty is an
acquittal which precludes reprosecution. 127 Most of the difficulty in this
particular area of double jeopardy law concerns determining whether a
particular judicial disposition of a case is an acquittal. A court's label that
the decree is an acquittal does not necessarily mean that it is one; 28
conversely, some dismissals and post-conviction events are the functional
equivalents of an acquittal.129 The Court has provided a functional defini-
tion of an acquittal, which helps to analyze ambiguous judicial decrees: "[A]
defendant is acquitted only when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged."13O
B. Types of Acquittals
1. True Acquittals
A jury's verdict of not guilty, a directed verdict of not guilty,' and
an acquittal on the merits in a bench trial all have the same double jeopardy
significance: "A judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of
not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to
convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second
trial would be necessitated by a reversal."
3 2
The proscription of the Double Jeopardy Clause applies no matter how
erroneous or ill-advised the trial court's decision appears to a reviewing
court. For example, an acquittal based on insufficient evidence bars
reprosecution, even if the insufficiency of the evidence resulted from the
trial court's erroneous exclusion of important evidence that might have
126. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
128. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975).
129. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986).
130. Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)).
131. A directed verdict of not guilty on one or more counts of a multi-count indictment
does not preclude conviction by the jury on the remaining counts. Sellers v. Boone, 261
S.C. 462, 467, 200 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1973).
132. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91.
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established guilt. 133 Such a judgment of acquittal "however erroneous, bars
further prosecution on any aspect of the count and hence bars appellate
review of the trial court's error."
134
Strictly speaking, once the trial court, prompted by its erroneous ruling
excluding important evidence, enters a judgment of acquittal, a reviewing
court cannot reverse the verdict. This result highlights the importance of
resolving motions to exclude evidence at a pretrial conference, before




When a jury, after being instructed on an offense and a lesser included
offense, returns a guilty verdict on the lesser offense, but is silent on the
greater, the jury has impliedly acquitted the defendant of greater of-
fense.136 The implied acquittal is as effective as an explicit acquittal in
precluding reprosecution on that charge.1
37
Green v. United States 38 is widely cited by courts explaining implied
acquittals. 13 In Green, the jury returned a guilty verdict for second degree
murder, but was silent on the first degree murder charge. After successfully
appealing his conviction for second degree murder, the defendant was
reprosecuted for first degree murder under the original indictment and was
convicted and sentenced to death."4 The Court concluded that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precluded reprosecuting the defendant for first degree
133. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1978).
134. Id. at 69. The Court had previously stated this position even more emphatically
by declaring that an acquittal precludes reprosecution even when "based on an
egregiously erroneous foundation." Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143
(1962).
135. See supra text accompanying note 52. In Sanabria v. United States the evidentiary
ruling that excluded the evidence could have been made before jeopardy attached, but in
fact was not. Actually, the motion was first made, and denied, at the close of the
government's case, well after jeopardy had attached. At the end of the defendant's case,
the trial court reviewed its earlier ruling and excluded the evidence. Sanabria, 437 U.S.
at 58-59.
136. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
137. Id. at 191.
138. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
139. E.g., Bozemanv. State, 307 S.C. 172, 174-75, 414 S.E.2d 144, 145-146 (1992)
(citing Green, 355 U.S. 184); see 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 93.
140. Green, 355 U.S. at 186. Ordinarily double jeopardy does not preclude retrial of
an offense for which a conviction has been reversed. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 672 (1896); see infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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murder because of the jury's implied acquittal on that charge at the original
trial.
141
A careful reading of the Green opinion suggests that the Court's
conclusion rested not on the jury's having found guilt on the lesser included
charge of second degree murder," but on the dismissal of the jury
without its having returned a verdict on the first degree murder charge and
without extraordinary circumstances that might have precluded the jury from
reaching a verdict. 43 Jeopardy attached when the defendant was tried
before a jury; " but, because the jury was dismissed without having
convicted the defendant of first degree murder, double jeopardy precluded
the defendant's reprosecution for first degree murder. 141
3. Pre-Jeopardy "Acquittals"
A pre-jeopardy acquittal is an oxymoron in terms of double jeopardy
jurisprudence. Events occurring before jeopardy attaches cannot cause
double jeopardy if a subsequent prosecution occurs, because, by definition,
the defendant has not previously been placed in jeopardy.
In Serfiass v. United States,'46 the leading case on this issue, the trial
court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment before the jury was
empaneled, because the evidence indicated a defense as a matter of law.147
Jeopardy had not attached because the jury had not been sworn, and the
judge was without power to determine guilt or innocence.148 A dismissal
141. Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91. The only issue before the Court was the validity of
the reprosecution for first degree murder. Ironically, as the law stands today the facts in
Green represent a rare situation in which double jeopardy would preclude retrial on the
original conviction charge. In 1978 the Court concluded that when an appellate court
reverses a conviction for insufficient evidence-the reason for the reversal of the second
degree murder conviction in Green-the conclusion is equivalent to an acquittal and
precludes reprosecution. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1978), discussed
infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
142. The Court noted that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy was based on the
jury's refusal to convict him for first degree murder, not on the jury's having convicted
him of second degree murder, a lesser included charge. Green, 355 U.S. at 190 n. 1l.
143. Id. at 191. Green was not a situation in which a hung jury was unable to agree
on a verdict, necessitating a mistrial. Reprosecution after a jury's failure to agree does
not violate double jeopardy. E.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579
(1824), discussed infra notes 492-503 and accompanying text.
144. Green, 355 U.S. at 188.
145. Id. at 191. The Court rejected the government's claim that Green had waived his
double jeopardy claim against reprosecution on the greater charge by appealing his
conviction for second degree murder. Id. at 191-92.
146. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
147. Id. at 379-82.
148. Id. at 389. For a discussion of the points at which jeopardy attaches, see supra
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based upon insufficient evidence or upon recognition of a defense estab-
lished as a matter of law would be the functional equivalent of an acquittal
if rendered after jeopardy had attached.149 However, in Serfass the court
granted a dismissal before jeopardy attached; consequently, the dismissal did
not trigger double jeopardy protection from the government's appeal and
planned reprosecution.'50
In United States v. Sanford51 the Court followed Serfass. In Sanford,
after the first trial ended in mistrial because of a hung jury, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because of a lack
of evidence of guilt.'52 The government appealed. The Court concluded
that, although jeopardy had attached at the first trial, which ended in a
mistrial, a hung jury mistrial does not preclude retrial.'53 When. the
indictment was dismissed, the charges were once again in a pretrial mode,
meaning that jeopardy had not attached; thus, the dismissal could not bar
reprosecution. 1
54
There seems to be a little slight of hand at work in Sanford. If the
doctrine of continuing jeopardy makes possible retrial following a mistrial,
then, by definition, the accused would appear to be in jeopardy from
jeopardy's attachment in the first trial until the conclusion of the subsequent
trial, including the time in between the two trials. Sanford apparently
introduces a concept of "suspended continuing jeopardy" that is applicable
during the period between the declaration of mistrial and the point at which
jeopardy would have ordinarily attached in the subsequent trial, had it been
an initial trial.
4. Post-Verdict Decisions Equivalent to Acquittal
Even after a jury verdict of guilty, there are at least two possible
opportunities for judicial rulings that could have a double jeopardy effect
similar or equal to that of a true acquittal. First, a trial judge may grant a
new trial based on insufficient evidence presented at trial.1 55 Second, an
text accompanying notes 48-51.
149. A dismissal after jeopardy has attached, if based on an insufficiency of the
evidence, is the functional equivalent of an acquittal and precludes reprosecution. See
infra text accompanying note 186.
150. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 394.
151. 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam).
152. The trial court concluded that the government had consented to the defendant's
activity which was the basis of a charge of illegal hunting. Id. at 14.
153. Id. at 15-16 (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)).
154. Id. at 16.
155. In South Carolina trial judges lack the authority to grant a judgment notwith-
standing the jury's verdict; they can only grant a motion for a new trial. State v. Miller,
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appellate court may reverse a conviction based on insufficient evidence
presented during trial.
Currently, the most significant case in the area of insufficient evidence
is Burks v. United States. 156 In Burks the court of appeals reversed a
conviction because of insufficient evidence and remanded with direction
either to grant a new trial or to enter a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme
Court unanimously concluded that the appellate court's determination of
insufficient evidence represented a resolution in defendant's favor "of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged."' Thus, instead of
remanding the case, the court of appeals should have entered a judgment of
acquittal, which would have, of course, precluded reprosecution.'"I The
Court rejected the government's claim that, by moving for a new trial, the
defendant waived his right to an acquittal based on insufficiency of the
evidence. 159
In Hudson v. Louisiana,'60 another unanimous decision, the Court
concluded that a trial court's granting a motion for a new trial because of
insufficient evidence after a jury has entered a verdict of guilty is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal. The Hudson Court found Burks to be
controlling on the double jeopardy significance of the lower court's
determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. The
Court also applied Burks to conclude that the defendant's motion for a new
trial did not constitute a waiver of double jeopardy protection. 61 In
Hudson the Court rejected the government's claim that, by disagreeing with
the jury's assessment of the weight of the evidence instead of merely deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge had functioned as a
"thirteenth juror." 1
62
In Tibbs v. Florida,163 however, the Court accepted the "thirteenth
juror" argument. The Court in Tibbs upheld the petitioner's conviction in
a new trial after the appellate court reversed the original conviction as
287 S.C. 280, 282 n.2, 337 S.E.2d 883, 884 n.2 (1985).
156. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
157. Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977)). The factual issue in Burks concerned the defendant's lack of mental capacity to
commit the crime. The appellate court concluded that the government did not rebut the
defendant's evidence of insanity. Id. at 4.
158. Id. at 10-11. For the Burks rule to apply, it must be clear that the reviewing court
granted a new trial because of insufficient evidence and not because of trial error. Green
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24-26 (1978).
159. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18.
160. 450 U.S. 40 (1981).
161. Id. at 43.
162. Id. at 44.
163. 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
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against the weight of the evidence."IM The Court explained the difference
between a reversal based on insufficient evidence and a reversal because of
a disagreement about the weight of the evidence:
[A] conviction rests upon insufficient evidence when, even after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, on the other
hand, draws the appellate court into questions of credibility. The
"weight of the evidence" refers to "a determination [by] the trier of fact
that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue
or cause than the other." 165
A reversal for insufficient evidence, meaning that no rational fact finder
could have voted to convict, is tantamount to an acquittal and bars
reprosecution.'" A reversal for disagreement on the weight of the evi-
dence, in which the appellate court sits as a "thirteenth juror," does not
mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict; consequently, reprosecution
following such a reversal does not deny protection against double jeopar-
dy. 67 The Tibbs Court rejected the defendant's argument that the distinc-
tion between the two types of reversals was unworkable and might lead
appellate courts to mask reversals based on insufficient evidence as reversals
based on disagreement on the weight of the evidence in order not to
preclude reprosecution. 6 s
The essence of double jeopardy protection, prohibiting retrial following
either acquittal or its functional equivalent, is that the government must not
risk convicting innocent citizens by wearing down defendants through
repeated trials, all the while perfecting its case.'69 The prohibition is
against reprosecutions, which are new proceedings at the trial court level in
which additional evidence is presented on the merits.
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from
appealing the conclusion of either a trial court or an appellate court that a
new trial should be granted because insufficient evidence was presented. 70
164. Id. at 42.
165. Id. at 37-38 (alteration in original) (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120,
1123 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam) (the decision below)).
166. Id. at 41-42.
167. Id. at 42-44.
168. Id. at 44-45. The Court noted in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), that
the Due Process Clause precludes the validity of any conviction resting on insufficient
evidence. However, the Court's reassurance did not persuade Justice White, who wrote
for the four dissenters. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 47 (White, J., dissenting).
169. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1975).
170. State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 395, 400, 297 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1982); see United
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For example, if a trial court grants a motion for a new trial because of
insufficient evidence following the jury's verdict of guilty, the government
can, on appeal, contest the trial court's decision. If the appellate court
agrees that the trial court's assessment of insufficient evidence was
incorrect, then the appellate court can reverse and remand with instructions
to enter a judgment of guilty based on the prior jury verdict of guilty.
Consequently, because no additional trial court proceedings are required,
double jeopardy is not violated. '
7'
Analogously, if an intermediate appellate court reverses a judgment of
guilty because of a perceived insufficiency of the evidence, the government
should be able to seek review in the jurisdiction's court of last result. If the
highest court disagrees with the intermediate court's conclusion about the
insufficiency of the evidence, the higher court can reverse and remand with
instructions to reinstate the original verdict. Double jeopardy would not be
violated under these circumstances because no additional trial court
proceedings would be required to determine guilt or innocence.
When an appellate court concludes that the lower court should have
excluded some prejudicial evidence and then examines the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the conviction, the appellate court should consider all of
the evidence before the trial court, including that which should have been
excluded.'"2 The inclusion of such evidence could be quite significant. The
Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial following reversal of a
conviction because of prejudicial trial error,'73 but does preclude retrial
if the reversal was because of insufficient evidence.174
States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1449 (11th Cir. 1988).
171. See Greer, 850 F.2d at 1449. The Supreme Court has never ruled on an appeal
from a trial court's judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence after a guilty
verdict was rendered. However, the Court has ruled that the government can appeal from
a trial court's judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict of guilty when the acquittal was
based on prejudicial pretrial delay. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
The Wilson Court's reasoning is the reasoning outlined in the above text and
followed by the eleventh circuit in Greer. Allowing the appeal in this situation does not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the appeal cannot result in additional trial
court proceedings to determine guilt or innocence. If the appellate court agrees with the
government that the trial court's reasoning was in error, the appellate court can reverse
and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a judgment of guilty based on
the previous jury verdict of guilty. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352. However, a post-
acquittal appeal that, if successful, would lead to further proceedings to resolve factual
issues related to a determination of guilt is prohibited. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476
U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986).
172. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1988).
173. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); see infra notes 241-245 and
accompanying text.
174. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), discussed supra notes 156-159 and
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5. Dismissals: Some Function as Acquittals, and Some Do Not
Dismissals cause a great deal of difficulty in double jeopardy law
because they are often confused with mistrials and acquittals. A judge
declaring a mistrial ordinarily contemplates that a subsequent prosecution
will occur, and typically a subsequent prosecution does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 175 However a true acquittal, or its functional
equivalent, triggers double jeopardy protection against subsequent prosecu-
tion. 76 A dismissal is similar to an acquittal in that the issuing judge
"contemplates that the proceedings will terminate then and there in favor of
the defendant."' A dismissal may or may not trigger double jeopardy
protection, depending on when and on what grounds the dismissal was
issued.
A dismissal prior to the point at which jeopardy attaches is not the
functional equivalent of an acquittal as far as the Double Jeopardy Clause
is concerned. If such a dismissal is overturned on appeal, subsequent
prosecution is not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause because no
prior jeopardy had attached. 7
A dismissal granted after jeopardy has attached must be analyzed more
closely to see whether it is the functional equivalent of an acquittal. The
most useful guide is the Court's definition of an acquittal: "[A] defendant
is acquitted only when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually
represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or
all of the factual elements of the offense charged.'"' 79
In United States v. Scott the post-jeopardy dismissal based on prejudi-
cial pre-indictment delay did not resolve the factual elements in the
defendant's favor. 8 Consequently, it was not an acquittal and did not
trigger double jeopardy protection from subsequent prosecution. The Court
noted that, by making a motion for dismissal, the defendant deliberately
sought termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to
factual guilt or innocence. The Court analogized the motion to a defendant's
motion for mistrial, which would also take the case away from the trier of
accompanying text.
175. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). Mistrials are discussed infra
Part VI.
176. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91.
177. Id. at 94.
178. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). Pre-jeopardy acquittals are
discussed supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
179. Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)).
180. Id. at 95.
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fact without triggering double jeopardy protection.'S'
A mistrial granted at the defendant's request will very rarely trigger
double jeopardy protection.' However, a post-jeopardy dismissal on
procedural grounds and not at the defendant's request might require a
different double jeopardy conclusion.
The Scott Court accurately characterized the defendant's motion as a
deliberate decision to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence
determined by that particular tribunal." s3 However, at least one federal
appellate court has concluded that when a trial court dismisses the case sua
sponte, albeit with the defendant's acquiescence, the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes subsequent proceedings. 1 1 In such circumstances, the
defendant is deprived of his valued right to be judged by that particular
tribunal. '1
A post-jeopardy dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence stands
in sharp contrast to the post-jeopardy dismissal on procedural grounds in
Scott. A dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence represents a
resolution in the defendant's favor of factual matters related to the elements
of the crime and, for purposes of double jeopardy, is the functional
equivalent of an acquittal.' 86
A problematical South Carolina statute provides that a person acquitted
because of a variance between indictment and proof may be arraigned on a
new indictment, tried, and convicted."' 7 While two early cases approved
of the practice authorized by the statute, neither addressed the constitutional-
ity of the statute.'88 Nevertheless, the statute's constitutionality is suspect.
181. Id. at 98-101.
182. See infra notes 458-491 and accompanying text.
183. Scott, 437 U.S. at 100-01.
184. United States v. Dahlstrum, 655 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
928 (1982).
185. Id. at 975. In Dahlstrum, after jeopardy had attached, the trial court dismissed
the indictment with prejudice because of governmental misconduct-viz., the IRS's use
of a § 7602 summons to aid in a criminal investigation. Defense counsel participated in
the judge's dismissal only to the extent of agreeing to the judge's suggestion that findings
of fact and conclusions of law be issued. Id. at 973. In United States v. Kennings, 861
F.2d 381 (3rd Cir. 1988), the court distinguished Dahlstrum because of defense counsel's
more active role in securing the dismissal in the latter case. Id. at 385 n.6.
186. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985). This section provides:
If a person on his trial be acquitted upon the ground of a variance between the
indictment and the proof or upon an exception to the form or substance of the
indictment he may be arraigned again on a new indictment and tried and
convicted for the same offense, notwithstanding such former acquittal.
Id.
188. State v. Gowan, 178 S.C. 78, 182 S.E. 159 (1935); State v. Platt, 154 S.C. 1,
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An acquittal because of a variance between proof and indictment
appears to meet the Court's definition of acquittal-a resolution of some of
the factual elements of the offense charged in favor of the defendant.s 9
Thus, such an acquittal would preclude reprosecution.1" If, however, the
new indictment charges an offense with different elements from those in the
original indictment, then the State would have a good argument that the new
offense is not the same offense as the earlier one; therefore, the State's
argument continues, the second prosecution does not subject the defendant
to double jeopardy."19
Faced with a variance between indictment and proof, the State might
fare marginally better by requesting a mistrial and arguing that retrial is not
prohibited because there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial. This
argument is not entirely convincing, especially if the difficulty was
foreseeable by exercising due diligence before jeopardy attached.' 92
Regardless of the court's label for the procedural maneuver dismissing
the prosecution because of the fatal variance, the dismissal might be treated
as the functional equivalent of an acquittal, thereby barring subsequent
prosecution. 93 Had the original prosecution resulted in a conviction,
151 S.E. 206 (1930). In Gowan the court upheld the statute as a valid legislative
amendment to the common-law rule of autrefois acquit, but did not address the statute's
constitutionality as per South Carolina Constitution, article I, § 12 (then § 17) because
the issue had not been raised below. Gowan, 178 S.C. at 83-84, 182 S.E. at 161.
In Platt the court reversed a murder conviction because the trial court improperly
amended the indictment at trial by charging the place of the murder victim's demise.
Platt, 154 S.C. at 22, 151 S.E. at 213. In dictum, the court observed that the defendant
could be held pending re-indictment and trial, but did not address any constitutional
issues involved. 1d.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment could not have been in issue
in either case because the Clause was not applicable to the states until 1969. See Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), discussed supra text accompanying note 37.
189. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
190. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
191. This argument may have been foreclosed by the 1990 case of Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), with
its "same conduct" approach to defining "same offense." After Dixon, the State's
argument should prevail if "same offense" is to be exclusively defined by the elements
test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See infra part V.B.
192. Compare Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (holding that mistrial
because the indictment failed to allege an offense met the manifest-necessity standard)
with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (holding that mistrial because
prosecution failed to secure the attendance of an important witness did not meet the
manifest-necessity standard). Somerville, Downum, and the issue raised in the text above
are discussed infra notes 518-533 and accompanying text.
193. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986).
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reprosecution would be permissible if the appellate court reversed because
the original indictment was either defective"9 or charged the wrong
offense. 155
C. Collateral Estoppel
In Ashe v. Swenson196 the Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy
Clause embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which precludes
relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact previously determined by a valid and
final judgment."9 However, relatively few cases implicate the collateral
estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9"
To collaterally estop the government, the defendant must establish that
a particular factual issue had previously been resolved in his favor. Ashe is
a classic example of such a case. In Ashe the defendant was one of four
persons who allegedly robbed six men at a poker game. In his first trial the
defendant was acquitted of robbing one of the victims. During the first trial
uncontroverted testimony established that the victim had been a participant
in the poker game and had been robbed. The only contested issue was
whether the defendant was one of the robbers, but the State's evidence
against the defendant was weak.'
Following acquittal on the first charge, the defendant was tried and
convicted for having robbed one of the other poker players.2' Significant-
ly, in the second trial the State had tightened its presentation.201 The Court
concluded that the defendant's identity as one of the robbers had been
194. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
195. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987).
196. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
197. Id. at 443.
198. If the first case involved the same offense as the subsequent charge, the basic
double jeopardy protection against multiple prosecution for the same offense applies, not
collateral estoppel.
199. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 438. The State's witnesses could not agree on how many
robbers robbed them. Two of the victims could not identify the defendant, and the other
two victims who testified made ambiguous identifications of the defendant. Id.
200. The basic double jeopardy protection against reprosecution following acquittal of
the same offense was inapplicable because the two charges were not for the same offense.
Robbing six poker players constitutes six separate offenses because each charge involves
a separate factual element-the identity of the victim. See State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356,
109 S.E. 133 (1921).
201. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 440. In the second trial the witnesses were much more certain
in their identification of the defendant, and the victim whose identification in the first
trial had been conspicuously negative was not called in the second trial. Id.
[Vol. 44:411
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/2
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
resolved in the defendant's favor at the earlier trial and could not be
relitigated in a second trial.'
Because verdicts in criminal cases are general, except for insanity
verdicts, a defendant may have difficulty establishing that a particular factual
issue has been resolved in his favor by the prior decision. A court
considering a prior general verdict of acquittal is "to 'examine the record
of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge,
and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks
to foreclose from consideration.'" 3
Applying this test, the Court in Turner v. Arkansasi 4 concluded that
a defendant who was acquitted of felony murder for killing someone during
the course of a robbery could not subsequently be charged for the underly-
ing robbery.205 The State's theory in the robbery trial was that the jury
might have concluded that the defendant and another robbed the victim, but
that the other participant killed the victim. The Court noted that, in light of
'the trial court's instructions on accomplice liability, if the jury found that the
defendant participated in the robbery, the jury would have been obligated
to convict for murder.' 6 Consequently, the jury's acquittal of murder re-
presented its conclusion that the defendant was not present at the crime
scene; therefore, collateral estoppel precluded a subsequent prosecution for
robbery.2
Another possible explanation for the acquittal in Turner is that the jury
simply ignored the instruction on accomplice liability, finding it unjust to
convict someone of murder who did not actually pull the trigger. Signifi-
cantly, the Court was willing to overlook the possibility of jury nullification.
Any judgment of acquittal could conceivably be explained in terms of
nullification, even the acquittal on the original robbery charge in Ashe v.
Swenson. The mere possibility of jury nullification is apparently not enough
to undermine the defendant's collateral estoppel argument.
The Court's receptivity to collateral estoppel claims is further evidenced
by Harris v. Washington,"°s in which an acquittal for the murder of one
victim of a bomb blast precluded a subsequent prosecution for the murder
of another killed by the same blast. Although the State's evidence on the
202. Id. at 446.
203. Id. at 444 (quoting Daniel K. Mayers & Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New
Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1960)).
204. 407 U.S. 366 (1972) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 369-70.
206. Id. at 369.
207. Id. at 369-70.
208. 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
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crucial identity issue in the first trial was hampered by erroneous rulings,
collateral estoppel applied in the subsequent trial. 20 9 The State's good faith
in bringing successive prosecutions was not enough to shield it from the
effects of collateral estoppel."'
Nonetheless, collateral estoppel is often difficult to establish. In State
v. Hess2  the defendant, the former Chief of the Columbia Police Depart-
ment, was convicted in Lexington County of misconduct in office, but
acquitted of accepting a bribe, extortion, and obstruction of justice. All of
the charges stemmed from the Chief's allegedly receiving money for
providing police information to people under criminal investigation.2" The
Chief was subsequently prosecuted in Calhoun County for the same
conduct21 3 and was convicted of obstruction of justice and misconduct in
office, but acquitted of bribery and extortion. The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the conviction for misconduct in office on double jeopardy
grounds, finding that misconduct in office is a continuing offense, the same
offense for which he had previously been convicted.2"4
However, the court rejected the Chief's collateral estoppel claim on the
obstruction of justice charge.2 5 In both prosecutions the Chief contended
that his purpose had been to lure the criminal suspect into an act of bribery
in order to make a case against him. The Chief argued that an essential
element of the obstruction of justice charge is corrupt intent and that,
because the first jury acquitted him of bribery, extortion, and obstruction of
justice, the jury must not have found corrupt intent. The court disagreed,
209. Id. at 56.
210. Id. at 56-57. In Ashe v. Swenson the State had "frankly conceded that following
the petitioner's acquittal, it treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second
prosecution: ... [the prosecutor] 'refined his presentation in light of the turn of events
at the first trial.'" Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (quoting Brief of
Respondent).
211. 279 S.C. 525, 309 S.E.2d 741, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983).
212. Id. at 527, 309 S.E.2d at 742. The facts in Hess are summarized in more detail
in the state supreme court's decision affirming the Lexington County conviction. State
v. Hess, 279 S.C. 14, 301 S.E.2d 547 (1983).
213. The rules in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), would have precluded prosecution for the same
conduct that constituted an element of a crime in an earlier prosecution. Consequently,
under the same-conduct test of Grady the entire second prosection in Hess might be
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Grady and Dixon are discussed infra part
V.B.
In State v. Wilson, 429 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 1993), the South Carolina Supreme Court
recently addressed both Grady and collateral estoppel issues. Wilson is discussed infra
notes 423-435 and accompanying text.
214. Hess, 279 S.C. at 528-29, 309 S.E.2d at 742-43.
215. Id. at 527, 309 S.E.2d at 742.
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concluding that the first jury must have found corrupt intent to have
convicted him of misconduct in office.2 16 Consequently, the crucial factual
issue on the existence of corrupt intent had not been resolved in the
defendant's favor in the first trial; therefore, collateral estoppel did not ap-
ply.
217
If the factual issue resolved in the defendant's favor during the first trial
is not an issue in a subsequent proceeding, then collateral estoppel is not
applicable. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States21s the defend-
ant, who had previously been acquitted of smuggling, subsequently lost his
jewels in a forfeiture proceeding.219 At the smuggling trial the court
expressly found that the government had failed to establish an intent to
defraud.' Nonetheless, collateral estoppel did not bar the forfeiture
proceeding because the forfeiture required only proof of physical importa-
tion without declaration, not proof of intent to defraud.'
While Ashe v. Swenson clearly holds that parts of collateral estoppel are
encompassed within the Double Jeopardy Clause,' 2 the South Carolina
Supreme Court has referred to collateral estoppel and double jeopardy as
two distinct bodies of law;m and to some extent they are separate.
Collateral estoppel evolved on the civil side of the docket, and not all
collateral estoppel aspects are applicable in the criminal context. For
example, the doctrine of mutuality does not apply to criminal cases.24
Ordinarily, collateral estoppel cannot be used against a defendant; thus, the
State is not entitled to a directed verdict based on a factual element earlier
resolved against the defendant.' A defendant may, however, be collater-
ally estopped from challenging facts admitted earlier pursuant to a guilty
plea.226
Guilty pleas may also affect the double jeopardy aspects of collateral
216. Id. at 527-28, 309 S.E.2d at 742.
217. Id.
218. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
219. Forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings to which the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply. Id. at 235-37; see supra text accompanying note 87.
220. Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 234.
221. Id.
222. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
223. State v. Mills, 281 S.C. 60, 62, 314 S.E.2d 324, 325 ("We hold that the
Respondent can find no comfort in either the law of double jeopardy or collateral estop-
pel."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984).
224. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443; id. at 464-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
225. See Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971) (per curiam). A directed
verdict of this nature would deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury.
226. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1989).
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estoppel in other ways. A guilty verdict for a lesser included offense of the
offense charged is, for double jeopardy purposes, an implied acquittal of the
greater offense. 7 The defendant cannot be reprosecuted for the greater
offense, and collateral estoppel precludes the government from attempting
to establish the factual element resolved in the defendant's favor by the
implied acquittal." 2 However, when the defendant enters a guilty plea to
the lesser offense over the government's objection, and the government
prosecutes the greater offense in the same proceeding, the guilty plea does
not serve as a resolution of the factual issue in the defendant's favor. 9
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has likewise concluded that the
collateral estoppel component of the protection against double jeopardy does
not preclude subsequent prosecution for the greater offense following an
earlier guilty plea to the lesser offense.?30
The different burden of proof requirements in criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings pose an additional obstacle to implementing collateral
estoppel. Conviction for a criminal offense requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Therefore, an acquittal means that reasonable doubt
existed about the defendant's guilt, not necessarily that the defendant was
innocent. Accordingly, an acquittal does not estop the government from
seeking to establish the same facts in a subsequent proceeding with a less
vigorous standard of proof, such as the preponderance of the evidence
standard in a civil forfeiture proceeding." By similar reasoning, a
"majority of American jurisdictions which have passed on the issue have
held that an acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not bar revocation of
parole or probation on the underlying charge."" However, when an
acquittal is based on an affirmative defense, such as entrapment, which the
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, the acquittal
will estop the subsequent revocation proceeding."
In Dowling v. United States 5 the Supreme Court employed similar
227. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The implied acquittal doctrine of
Green is discussed supra notes 136-145 and accompanying text.
228. Pugliese v. Perrin, 731 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1984).
229. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). Because the greater charges were pursued
in the same proceeding, double jeopardy's finality concerns were not implicated. Id. at
501-02.
230. State v. Jefferies, 304 S.C. 141,403 S.E.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'don other
grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1464 (1992).
231. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
232. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235
(1972).
233. People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 399 N.E.2d 894, 896 (N.Y. 1979).
234. Id. at 897.
235. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
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reasoning to conclude that evidence of a crime of which the defendant had
been acquitted may be admissible in a subsequent trial involving similar
circumstances."s Introducing acquittal evidence does not offend the
collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause because of the
different levels of proof required. While the earlier acquittal represented a
failure to establish guilt beyond a reasonable double, evidence of prior
crimes is admissible "if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor"' 7-a lesser standard. In
United States v. Felix 8 the Court recently referred to Dowling as "an
endorsement of the basic, yet important, principle that the introduction of
relevant evidence of particular misconduct in a case is not the same thing as
prosecution for that conduct.""
IV. REPROSECUTION FOLLOWING CONVICTION
One of the basic guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the
prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense of which one
has already been convicted.240 A necessary exception to this rule has long
been recognized: reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction has been
reversed on appeal is allowed. As the Court observed in United States v.
Ball,241 "it is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment
against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the
same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offense of which
he had been convicted." 242
The Ball rule serves both the public's interest in punishing the guilty
and the defendant's interest in having an effective appellate system that
ensures a fair trial.
It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused
granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to
constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.
From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate
236. Id. at 347-50. In the bank robbery trial at issue in Dowling, the trial court
admitted modus operandi evidence of another armed robbery for which the defendant had
been acquitted. Id. at 345-46.
237. Id. at 348.
238. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
239. Id. at 1383. Felix is discussed infra notes 349-364 and accompanying text.
240. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1977); Ex Parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176,
183 (1889). Determining whether the offenses in the two prosecutions are the same is,
however, surprising complex. See infra Part V.
241. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
242. Id. at 672.
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courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the
effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that
reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably beyond the
reach of further prosecution.243
The Ball rule allows reprosecution following reversal of a conviction either
on collateral review or on direct appeal, regardless of whether the initial
conviction was pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty or the defendant's guilty
plea." Additionally, the reprosecution following reversal of a conviction
need not be pursuant to the same statute under which the defendant was
initially charged. 5
The Ball rule is inapplicable, however, if the conviction was reversed
because of insufficient evidence to support the conviction.246 In Burks v.
United States 7 the Court reasoned that the appellate court's conclusion
of insufficient evidence, which represented a resolution in the defendant's
favor of some or all of the elements of the offense, is analogous to a trial
court's granting a motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient
evidence.248 Because the trial court's acquittal would have precluded
reprosecution for the same offense,249 the Court unanimously concluded
that the appellate court's finding of insufficient evidence should have the
same effect; otherwise, the prosecution would be afforded another opportu-
nity to marshal enough evidence to convict-an opportunity the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits."o
A reversal of a conviction for insufficient evidence must be distin-
guished from a reversal because of the appellate court's disagreement with
the trial court's assessment of the weight of the evidence. Reversal on the
latter ground does not preclude reprosecution.1' The Burks rule applies
243. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
244. See id. at 466-67. Tateo involved a retrial after the appellate court reversed the
defendant's conviction on collateral review because the court found that the guilty plea
was involuntary. Id.
245. Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987). In Hall the Court concluded that a
defendant whose incest conviction had been reversed could subsequently be prosecuted
under a criminal sexual assault statute. Id. at 403.
246. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
247. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
248. Id. at 10-11. The only factual issue on appeal in Burks was the defendant's mental
capacity to commit the crime. Id. at 3.
249. Id. at 10-11.
250. Id. at 11.
251. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982); For a discussion of reversal pursuant to
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when the reversal was clearly based on the insufficiency of the evi-
dence.?5 2
If an appellate court concludes that a conviction is based on insufficient
evidence, but that sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction for a
lesser included offense, could the court reverse the conviction and remand
with orders to enter a conviction for the lesser included offense? Or, could
the court reverse and remand for retrial on the lesser included offense? In
Green v. Massey," a companion case to Burks, the Supreme Court noted
the existence of these issues without resolving them. 4
Pre-Burks appellate decisions, both state and federal, regularly reversed
convictions based on insufficient evidence and remanded with instructions
to enter guilty verdicts on lesser included offenses5' Post-Burks decisions
are split. Cases finding no double jeopardy violation when an appellate court
orders conviction for a lesser included offense reason that the jury
necessarily found the existence of every element of the lesser included
offense in order to convict of the greater offense. Therefore, if the element
distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense is the only insufficiently
supported element, the defendant is properly convicted of the lesser
offense .56 A contrary decision concluded that allowing reprosecution on
the lesser included offense forces the accused to "run the gauntlet"
again.?5
7
Burks appears not to preclude reprosecution for a lesser included
offense following reversal of a conviction for the greater offense based on
insufficient evidence on the element that distinguishes the greater offense
from the lesser offense; however, reversing and remanding with instructions
to enter a guilty verdict for the lesser included offense seems inappropriate.
Certainly the original jury must have found that every element of the lesser
offense existed in order to convict of the greater. Yet, it does not necessarily
follow that the jury would have convicted for the lesser offense had it been
252. Green v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1978).
253. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
254. Id. at 25 n.7.
255. E.g., United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977); Luitze v. State, 234
N.W. 382 (1931); see also 3 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 91 n.31 (citing both
Cobb and Luitze).
256. See Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 644
F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1981); Exparte Edwards, 452 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1984).
257. Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 350 (1991). In Stephens the jury had not been instructed on the lesser included
offense. Id. at 817. Nonetheless, the jury apparently found that every element of the




McAninch: Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
presented with only the lesser charge. 5 Consequently, the better practice
is to reverse the conviction for the greater offense and remand for retrial on
the lesser included offense.
After an intermediate appellate court reverses a conviction based on
insufficient evidence, the State can seek review of the reversal in a higher
appellate court without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 9 If the
higher court disagrees with the intermediate court's conclusion of insuffi-
cient evidence, then the higher court can simply reverse the intermediate
court's decision and remand with instructions to reinstate the original
conviction. No double jeopardy would occur because no additional factual
determinations would be made at the trial court level. 2"
Because of the nature of appellate review on the sufficiency of the
evidence,26 the Burks exception to the Ball rule that allows reprosecution
following reversal of conviction will affect relatively few cases.262 Of
course, the law recognizes other grounds, unrelated to the Double Jeopardy
Clause, for reversing a conviction that would preclude reprosecution.263
V. THE SAME OFFENSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits not only reprosecution for the
258. See Edwards, 452 So. 2d at 510-11 (Jones, J., dissenting).
259. United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
944 (1980).
260. Id. at 29-30. In Forcellati the defendant was convicted at a non-jury trial before
a magistrate. The district court reversed the conviction, and the government appealed.
Id. at 27. The court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the conviction.
Id. at 32. The Forcellati court followed the reasoning of United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 344 (1975), and found no double jeopardy because reversing the district court
with an order to enter a judgment of guilty based on the pre-existing verdict would not
subject the defendant to additional trial court proceedings on guilt or innocence.
Forcellati, 610 F.2d at 29.
261. A federal appellate court must sustain the conviction if there is substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to uphold the guilty
verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (citing Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence is similar in South Carolina. See State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 395, 400, 297
S.E.2d 414, 416-17 (1982).
262. A reviewing court which has concluded that evidence was improperly admitted
at trial should nonetheless consider the improperly admitted evidence when judging the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Lockhartv. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), discussed supra
text accompanying note 172.
263. For example, a conviction reversed because of violation of an accused's right to
a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment must result in dismissal of the charge.
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
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same offense following conviction or acquittal for that offense, but also
multiple punishments for the same offense.264 Obviously, determining
whether one offense is the same as another is crucial, especially in light of
"the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory
offenses... [that makes it] possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly
numerous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction. "21
Two distinctly different scenarios present situations in which a "same
offense" determination must be made: reprosecution following a prior
acquittal or conviction, and multiple charges arising out of a single incident
and pursued in a single prosecution.
There is considerable confusion about the extent to which the tests for
same offense in the two different contexts are themselves the same. In
United States v. Dixon,21 which overruled the three-year-old case of
Grady v. Corbin,267 the Court stated that the tests are the same, although
the application of the test in Dixon suggests that they may not be.268
Consequently, short-lived as it may have been, Grady's same-conduct test
will be developed in some detail, infra.269
A. Multiple Charges in a Single Prosecution
Double jeopardy law regarding multiple charges in a single prosecution
is reasonably clear. Probably the most familiar and most frequently cited test
for "same offense" is in Blockburger v. United States:2 70 "The applicable
rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
264. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
265. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
266. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
267. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849.
268. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Dixon, but lost three of his four
supporting votes when he applied Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),
to find a double jeopardy bar to the successive prosecution of some of the counts under
review. Speaking for the departing three justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist found Scalia's
analysis to be remarkably Grady-like for a case that had overruled Grady. Dixon, 113
S. Ct. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269. Some courts, including those which adopted the same-conduct test in advance of
Grady, see State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986), may be persuaded
by Souter's Dixon dissent and may continue to apply the same-conduct test as a function
of state constitutional law. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2881-91 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
270. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger is now said to provide the test for same
offense in the context of successive prosecutions, as well as in the context of multiple
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these are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not."271
Applying this test, the Court in Blockburger concluded that a single sale
of contraband could support convictions, in a single trial, for violations of
separate statutory provisions.2 ' The statutes created two distinct offenses,
each of which contained an element that the other did not; the single act of
selling violated both statues.273 The prosection in Blockburger involved a
single instance of conduct-one sale of narcotics-that violated two statutory
provisions. Yet, no double jeopardy violation occurred because, in the
context of a single prosecution, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit multiple punishments for a single criminal act.274 "'[T]he Double
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.'" 275
The Blockburger test is a guide, and no more than that, to ascertaining
whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishment for a
single act.276 If the legislature defined two offenses with different ele-
ments, as in Blockburger, the intent was to authorize multiple punishments.
Conversely, if each offense does not contain at least one element that the
other does not, then the legislature did not intend to authorize separate
punishments for a single act.2'
Numerous South Carolina cases have followed the Blockburger
271. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
272. Id. at 303-04.
273. Id. One of the statutes violated in Blockburger provided: "'It shall be unlawful
for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs [opium
and other narcotics] except in the original stamped package . . . .'" Id. at 301 n.1
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 692 (1926)). The other violated statute provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away
any of the drugs specified in section 691 of this title, except in pursuance of
a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered,
exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
Id. at 301 n.2 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 696 (1926)).
274. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
275. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990) (quoting Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366),
overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). To the extent that any
quasi-Grady same-conduct test survives at all, it applies only in the context of successive
prosecutions, not in the context of multiple charges in a single prosecution.
276. Alberaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) ("The Blockburger test is
a 'rule of statutory construction,' and because it serves as a means of discerning
congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a
clear indication of contrary legislative intent.").
277. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991).
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reasoning and have concluded that multiple punishments are not authorized
for a single criminal act that violates two or more statutory offenses unless
each statute contains independent elements."'
Because Blockburger is only a guide to statutory interpretation, the fact
that each of two offenses contains an independent element does not compel
the conclusion that the legislature intended multiple punishment for a single
criminal act. In State v. Walsh279 the South Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that, although the statutory offense of pointing a firearm280 and
the common-law offense of assault with intent to kill281 have independent
elements, the legislature did not indicate an intention to authorize multiple
punishments for a single criminal act when it enacted the statute about
pointing a firearm. '
The South Carolina court has dispensed with Blockburger analysis when
the legislative intent concerning multiple punishments for a single criminal
act is clear from the statute's structure.8 3 In Matthews v. State2 4 the
court focused on the statutory scheme of increasing punishments for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for trafficking in
marijuana. The court concluded that separate penalties for possession with
intent to distribute and for trafficking were not authorized for the same act
of possession, without regard to whether the two offenses have independent
elements.u
In Missouri v. Hunter"s6 the Court sustained separate punishments for
a single criminal act. The defendant had been convicted for both first degree
robbery while using a dangerous or deadly weapon and armed criminal
278. E.g., State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 385 S.E.2d 830 (1989) (holding that larceny
is a lesser included offense of robbery); State v. Lawson, 279 S.C. 266, 305 S.E.2d 249
(1983) (same).
279. 300 S.C. 427, 388 S.E.2d 777 (1990).
280. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-410 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
281. State v. McKeller, 85 S.C. 236, 67 S.E. 314 (1910), cited in Walsh, 300 S.C.
at 429, 388 S.E.2d at 779.
282. Walsh, 300 S.C. at 431, 388 S.E.2d at 780.
283. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 240, 387 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1990).
284. 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258 (1990).
285. Id. at 240, 387 S.E.2d at 259. Possession with intent to distribute requires
possession of any amount plus the requisite intent, which may be inferred from
possession of at least one ounce of marijuana. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(d)(3) (Law.
Co-op. 1985). Trafficking depends solely on possession of at least ten pounds of
marijuana without a requirement of proof of intent to distribute. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
53-370(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991). The two sections have independent
elements-intent to distribute for the former, and possession of ten pounds for the latter.
Nonetheless, the court's conclusion that the legislature did not intend to authorize
multiple punishments appears sound when the statute's overall structure is examined.
286. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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action.2" Even though, according to the Blockburger test, the two offenses
were not distinct because the offenses did not contain independent elements,
the legislative intent to authorize separate punishments was nonetheless
clear.8 8 Consequently, the separate convictions and punishments for the
single act imposed in a single criminal prosecution did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause."
Confronted with facts and statutory offenses quite similar to those in
Missouri v. Hunter, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
separate punishments for armed robbery and possession of a weapon during
a violent crime are permissible for a single criminal act prosecuted in a
single trial.2" Because the legislative intent to authorize multiple punish-
ment is clear on the face of the statute about possession of a weapon during
a violent crime,29 ' multiple punishments do not violate the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause.2'
287. Id. at 362.
288. Id. at 368-69. The Missouri statute that prescribes the punishment for robbery in
the first degree provides in pertinent part: "'Every person convicted of robbery in the
first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and every person convicted of
robbery in the first degree by any other means shall be punished by imprisonment by the
division of corrections for not less than five years.'" Id. at 361-62 (quoting Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 560.135 (Vernon 1979)). The Missouri statute that proscribes armed criminal
action provides in pertinent part:
"[Any person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with,
or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also
guilty of the crime of armed criminal action and, upon conviction, shall be
punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections for a term of not less
than three years. The punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be
in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed by,
with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon.
No person convicted under this subsection shall be eligible for parole, proba-
tion, conditional release or suspended imposition or execution of sentence for
a period of three calendar years."
Id. at 362 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. §559.225 (Vernon 1979) (emphasis added)).
289. Id. at 368-69.
290. State v. Bolden, 303 S.C. 41, 398 S.E.2d 494 (1990).
291. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). This statute provides:
Any person who is convicted of committing or attempting to commit a violent
crime as defined in § 16-1-60, if the person is in possession of a firearm or
visibly displays what appears to be a firearm or visibly displays a knife during
the commission of the violent crime, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for the crime, be punished by a term of imprisonment of five years.
Id. (emphasis added).
292. Bolden, 303 S.C. at 44, 398 S.E.2d at 495. The court's conclusion on the double
jeopardy issue in Bolden is dictum because the conviction was reversed on other grounds.
Id. Nonetheless, the court's reasoning on the double jeopardy issue appears sound.
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Furthermore, in State v. Hall" the court also relied on Hunter's
analysis to sustain convictions for kidnapping and criminal sexual conduct
in the first degree during a single criminal act, even though kidnapping may
have been used to escalate the criminal sexual conduct to the first de-
gree.
294
What may appear, at first glance, to be a single criminal act may
nonetheless embody a number of discrete violations of the same criminal
statute. The facts in the collateral estoppel case, Ashe v. Swenson,
29 s
provide an excellent example. In Ashe three or four masked gunmen robbed
six players in a poker game. Each of the gunmen could have been prosecut-
ed for six counts of armed robbery,296 as well as for one count of grand
larceny, because the gunmen stole one of the poker players' automobiles to
make a getaway. 2 7 Similarly, in Blockburger the defendant's selling of
contraband twice to the same vendee was held to constitute separate
offenses, each of which could have been separately prosecuted.29
B. Successive Prosecutions
1. Federal Cases
a. The Traditional Test
The test of Blockburger v. United States2' for same offense,
293. 280 S.C. 74, 76, 310 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1983).
294. Id. at 76, 310 S.E.2d at 431; see also State v. Dildine, 306 S.C. 198, 202, 410
S.E.2d 597, 599-600 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding consecutive sentences for kidnapping,
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, and attempted criminal sexual
conduct, all stemming from a single criminal act). The Hall case is muddied by the fact
that the assailant also used a deadly weapon in the assault, which also could have raised
the underlying criminal sexual conduct to the first degree. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
652 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
295. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
296. See id. at 446. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan cited a case in which
each of 75 poker hands was found to constitute a separate offense against gambling laws.
Johnsonv. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923), cited inAshe, 397 U.S.
at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's point was not that the six robberies
were one offense, but that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that they all be
prosecuted in a single trial rather than one at a time in successive prosecutions. Ashe,
397 U.S. at 453-54.
297. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 437-38.
298. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03 (1932). While this position
has never been explicitly endorsed by a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia complained
that the Court's conclusion in Grady v. Corbin has that effect. Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 536-43 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by United States v. Dixon,
113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
299. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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"whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other
does not,"" is the traditional standard for double jeopardy analysis of
successive prosecutions. Employing this test, the Court in Brown v.
Ohio30 1 concluded that a prosecution for auto theft was foreclosed by an
earlier conviction for the lesser included offense of joyriding." Joyriding
in Ohio involves taking another's vehicle without permission; auto theft is
joyriding plus the intent to permanently deprive the owner of posses-
sion.3 3 Consequently, according to Blockburger, joyriding is the same
offense as auto theft because joyriding fails to require proof of a fact that
auto theft does not. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
prosecution for the latter offense following conviction for the former.304
Indeed, the Court noted that "[w]hatever the sequence may be, the Fifth
Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for
a greater and lesser included offense."305 The Court rejected the State's
contention that the auto theft could be prosecuted on the date the car was
taken and joyriding at some later date.3"6
The Brown Court's dictum concerning the irrelevance of whether the
greater or lesser offense is prosecuted first soon became a holding. In Harris
v. Oklahoma" the Court considered whether the greater or lesser offense
should be prosecuted first. The Court concluded that a felony murder
conviction precluded subsequent prosecution for the underlying felony. 308
Jeffers v. United States,31 a companion case to Brown v. Ohio,
established that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive
prosecutions if the defendant is responsible for the charges' not having been
300. Id. at 304.
301. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
302. Id. at 168-69.
303. Id. at 167.
304. Id at 169.
305. Id. The Court noted an important exception to this rule: when, at the time of the
prosecution for the lesser offense, the greater could not have been prosecuted because
additional facts necessary to the greater charge had not occurred or had not been discov-
ered despite the State's exercise of due diligence. Id. at 169 n.7.
306. Id. at 169-70. Of course, one might have taken a car initially without an intent
to permanently deprive the owner of possession, but subsequently formed that intent, in
which case what started out as joyriding did not become auto theft until later. In such a
situation, however, it is difficult to imagine either how the joyriding offense might be
prosecuted before the auto theft ripened or how, at the time of the prosecution, the State
would not have been aware of the intent to steal.
307. 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
308. Id. at 682. The State conceded that proving all the elements of the underlying
armed robbery was necessary to establish the earlier felony murder charge. Id. at 682
n.*.
309. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
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consolidated in a single prosecution2. ° In Jeffers the defendant, charged
with two counts of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and with conducting a
continuing criminal enterprise to violate the drug laws, successfully objected
to the government's motion to consolidate the two indictments for trial. The
defendant argued that much of the evidence admissible against his codefend-
ants on the conspiracy charge would be inadmissible and prejudicial to his
charge for continuing criminal enterprise. The four-justice plurality reasoned
that because the defendant was responsible for the successive prosecutions
he waived his double jeopardy claim against the subsequent prosecution.3 '
Similarly, in Ohio v. Johnson32 the Court concluded that Brown's
rule against successive prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses
is not violated by trying a defendant for murder and aggravated robbery
after the defendant has entered, over the State's objection, guilty pleas to the
lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter and grand theft.
313
After accepting the pleas to the lesser included offenses, the trial court
dismissed the greater charges because prosecution for the greater offenses
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple
punishments unauthorized by the legislature.3 4 Assuming that the legisla-
ture had not intended cumulative punishments for these particular greater
and lesser included offenses," 5 the issue of appropriate punishment could
be addressed only after a finding of guilt on the greater offense. 6 The
defendant, through his motion to dismiss, was responsible for the greater
offenses' not being tried at the original trial; therefore, the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not preclude subsequent prosecution for the greater offenses. 7
b. The Same-Conduct Test
In Brown, Harris, and Jeffers, the Court used the basic Blockburger
310. Id. at 152-54 (plurality opinion).
311. Id. at 153-54. The plurality concluded that the defendant was not forced to choose
between his right to a fair trial and his guarantee against double jeopardy. He could have
avoided the prejudicial evidence by making a motion to sever his conspiracy charge from
the conspiracy charges against his co-conspirators; thus, he still could have been tried in
a single prosecution for his two offenses. Id. at 153 n.21.
312. 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
313. Id. at 494.
314. Id.
315. The Ohio Supreme Court had so concluded below. Id. at 496-99 (citing State v.
Johnson, 453 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1983)).
316. See id. at 499-500 (stating that if the defendant were convicted for the greater
offense, presumably he would be credited with the sentence received earlier on the lesser
offenses).
317. Id. at 502.
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approach to determine whether offenses charged in successive prosecutions
were the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, in
Illinois v. Vitale"8 the Court indicated that Blockburger might not always
be sufficient in the context of successive prosecutions.3 9 The issue in
Vitale was whether a conviction for "failing to reduce speed to avoid an
accident" would preclude subsequent prosecution for an involuntary
manslaughter charge arising out of the same accident.32
Failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident is not inherently a lesser
included offense of involuntary manslaughter because the reckless operation
of a motor vehicle in a manner likely to cause death-requisite to a
conviction for involuntary manslaughter-may be established by conduct
other than failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.32" ' If other evidence
of reckless driving would suffice for manslaughter, then manslaughter and
failure to reduce speed would not be the same offense under the Blockburger
test because each offense would require proof of a fact that the other does
not.32
Nonetheless, the Court found the Blockburger test inadequate to resolve
the double jeopardy issue in Vitale. Proof of reckless driving by evidence
of conduct other than failure to slow to avoid an accident presumably would
not preclude a subsequent manslaughter prosecution. On the other hand, if
the State had to establish the failure to slow in order to prove the reckless
driving requisite to manslaughter, then the defendant would be prosecuted
for conduct for which he had already been convicted; thus, "his claim of
double jeopardy would be substantial. ""
The suggestion in Vitale became the holding in Grady v. Corbin:324
318. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
319. See id. at 419.
320. Id. at 415-16. The Illinois trial court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss
the manslaughter prosecution based on Illinois's double jeopardy statute. The motion was
granted before the State presented its evidence. Id. at 413-15.
321. Id. at 419. As the United States Supreme Court noted, the state supreme court
had not addressed this possibility in its "rather cryptic remarks about the relationship
between the two offenses." Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 420. The Court buttressed its dictum by noting the similarity to Harris v.
Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977): Because felony murder does not inevitably require
proof of armed robbery, armed robbery and felony murder are not the same offense per
Blockburger. Nonetheless, if armed robbery is the underlying felony that makes the
homicide a felony murder, then the felony murder prosecution precludes a subsequent
prosecution for the underlying felony charge of armed robbery. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420-
21.
324. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849
(1993). A helpful discussion of Grady is in The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading
Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv. 129, 149-58 (1990).
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"We hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if,
to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted. "11
The facts in Grady closely mirror those in Vitale. After an accident in
which one person was killed and another injured, the defendant in Grady
entered guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges of driving while intoxicated and
failing to keep to the right of the median. Subsequently, the defendant was
indicted for reckless manslaughter, second degree vehicular manslaughter,
criminally negligent homicide for the killed victim, third degree reckless
assault for the injured victim, and driving while intoxicated. The State's bill
of particulars indicated that the State would establish the homicide and
assault charges by proving the following reckless or negligent acts:
(1) driving while intoxicated; (2) failing to keep to the right of the median;
and (3) driving too fast for conditions.326
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant should
have been granted his requested writ of prohibition barring prosecution on
all counts in the indictment for two reasons. First, as a matter of state law,
driving while intoxicated is a lesser included offense of second degree
vehicular manslaughter. 327 The second and more significant reason was
that the State's intent to rely on the prior traffic offenses to establish
homicide and assault was barred by the "'pointed dictum'" in Vitale.
328
Disregarding the second degree vehicular homicide charge, the
defendant conceded that, according to the Blockburger test, the earlier traffic
offenses were not the same offenses as the homicide and assault charg-
es. 329 However, a crucial part of the Court's holding, and a source of
major contention with the dissent, 330 is that the Blockburger test is only the
first part in a two-step determination of whether two offenses are the same
when prosecuted in successive trials.331
325. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
326. Id. at 513-14.
327. Id. at 514.
328. Id. at 514-15 (citing Corbin v. Hillery, 543 N.E.2d 714, 719-20 (N.Y. 1989)).
329. Id. at 522. The State did not challenge the ruling of the New York Court of
Appeals that Blockburger barred the second degree vehicular homicide charge, and that
state law barred the driving while intoxicated charge. Thus, the only issue before the
Grady Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the assault and other
homicide charges. Id. at n.13.
330. Id. at 527-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 516. The Court noted that Blockburger serves only as a guide for statutory
interpretation, primarily used to determine whether Congress intended multiple
punishments for the same act when multiple charges are tried in a single prosecution. Id.
at 517. The Court observed that none of the cases relied upon in Justice Scalia's dissent
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The second step in the determination is that, even if the two offenses
are not the same under Blockburger, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any
subsequent prosecutions in which the government, to establish an essential
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecut-
ed."332 This second step is necessary, the Court reasoned, to serve the
crucial Double Jeopardy Clause goal of protecting the defendant from
repeated attempts to convict, which not only subject the defendant to
prolonged anxiety and expense, but also give the State the opportunity to
rehearse and improve its presentation.333
The Court emphasized that its new same-conduct test "is not an 'actual
evidence' or 'same evidence' test."334 Merely presenting evidence in one
trial does not necessarily preclude the government from presenting the same
evidence in a later trial.335 Earlier in the same term, in Dowling v. United
States,336 the Court approved the introduction of modus operandi evidence
in the defendant's bank robbery prosecution. Such evidence related to
another armed offense of which the defendant had previously been
acquitted.337 Confusingly, however, the Court in Grady did not explain
exactly how the results in the two cases were consistent-a point noted in
both Grady dissents.
38
The Grady Court recognized two exceptions to its same-conduct test.
The same-conduct approach of Grady should not apply if, at the time of the
initial prosecution, the additional facts requisite to the greater charge had not
yet occurred, or had not been discovered despite the exercise of due
diligence.339 In Grady, because the accident victim was dead when the
suggests that Blockburger is the exclusive definition of "same offense" in the context of
successive prosecutions. Id. at 517 n.8.
332. Id. at 521.
333. Id. at 518-19.
334. Id. at 521.
335. Id. at 521-22.
336. 493 U.S. 342 (1990), cited in Grady, 495 U.S. at 522.
337. Id. at 348-52.
338. Justice O'Connor limited her solo dissent to a perceived inconsistency between
the two cases. Grady, 495 U.S. at 524-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She observed that
the modus operandi evidence-wearing a ski mask during both crimes-that was used to
establish identity in the second trial appeared to prove conduct for which the accused had
been previously prosecuted. Id. at 525. Justice Scalia made the same point in his wider
ranging dissent. Id. at 538-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Felix, 112
S. Ct. 1377 (1992) (reaffirming Dowling and Grady), discussed infra notes 349-364 and
accompanying text.
339. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516 n.7. The Court described these exceptions by quoting
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977), including the reference to Diaz v. United
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defendant pleaded guilty to the traffic offenses, the first exception did not
apply. Likewise, the second exception did not apply in Grady because the
trial judge's and the prosecutor's lack of awareness that the victim had died
did not reflect the exercise of due diligence.340
Did Grady v. Corbin implement, as Justice Scalia maintained,34' the
same transaction joinder requirement urged by Justice Brennan in Ashe v.
Swenson?342 Justice Brennan's rule would require that all the charges
springing from a single criminal transaction be joined into a single
prosecution.3 43 For example, in the Ashe poker game robbery, all charges
would have to be tried in a single trial in order to serve the Double Jeopardy
Clause by protecting against a defendant's being worn down by the powerful
State's repeated prosecutions, in which the State would be able to rehearse
and refine its presentation to a jury.3" Justice Brennan, the author of the
Grady opinion, denied that Grady implemented the same transaction joinder
requirement. He noted that on remand the State would still be allowed to
pursue the homicide prosecution if it could establish the requisite reckless-
ness solely by proof of driving too fast for conditions-conduct for which
the defendant had not previously been prosecuted.345
How likely was Grady to survive? Given the acerbic nature of the
dissent346 and that two members of the five-justice majority have been
replaced,347 Grady's prognosis did not appear too good. Grady's survival
States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912), in which the Court held that an earlier assault
prosecution for the same conduct before the victim died did not foreclose a subsequent
homicide prosecution.
340. One Assistant District Attorney (ADA) had been called to the accident scene and
was notified later that evening when the victim died. Three days later another ADA
started a homicide investigation, but never attempted to discover the date of the traffic
charge trial and did not inform that court or the other ADA of the homicide investiga-
tion. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the traffic offenses twenty-four days after the
accident and was sentenced twenty-one days later. At sentencing, the ADA, unaware of
the fatality, recommended a minimum sentence. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511-13.
341. Id. at 527, 53943 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), discussed supra notes
196-202 and accompanying text.
343. See id.
344. Id. at 457-60.
345. Grady, 495 U.S. at 523.
346. Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There are many questions here, and the
answers to all of them are ridiculous.").
347. Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion, was replaced by Justice
Souter, and Justice Marshall by Justice Thomas. In United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993), which overruled Grady, Souter voted to uphold the same-conduct test.
Thomas supplied the crucial fifth vote to overrule. Because Justice White was one of the
four dissenters in Dixon, his replacement by Justice Ginsburg should not affect Dixon's
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was especially dubious in light of the views of Chief Justice Rehnquist, one
of the Grady dissenters, on stare decisis regarding constitutional decisions
that he believes are "unworkable or are badly reasoned. "348
Consequently, United States v. Felix,349 the Court's first opportunity
to reconsider Grady, was something of a surprise. The defendant in Felix
had operated a methamphetamine (speed) lab in Oklahoma, but when the lab
was shut down, he tried to set up another lab in Missouri. In the Missouri
trial for attempting to set up the new lab, the government based its
prosecution partly on the defendant's possession of the necessary chemicals
and equipment. To establish criminal intent by possession, the government
introduced evidence that the defendant had manufactured speed in Oklaho-
ma. Felix was convicted by the Missouri court. Subsequently, he was
prosecuted in Oklahoma for conspiracy to manufacture speed and for
substantive drug offenses pursuant to the conspiracy. To support the
substantive drug offenses in Oklahoma, the government introduced much of
the same evidence that had been used in the earlier Missouri prosecution.
Additionally, two of the overt acts supporting the conspiracy charge were
based on the same conduct that had been prosecuted in Missouri. Again,
Felix was convicted on all counts.35 Affirming the convictions, the Court
narrowed, but did not reverse, Grady.
35
1
The evidence used to establish some of the substantive charges in
Oklahoma was the same as that used to prove Felix's criminal intent in the
earlier Missouri prosecution.3 52 However, because the evidence in the
Oklahoma trial was not evidence of conduct for which the defendant had
been previously prosecuted in the Missouri trial, the Court distinguished
Grady.353 In Grady the Court eschewed any characterization of that
decision as a "same evidence" test,354 and the evidence against Felix was
clearly admissible under Dowling v. United States.
355
vitality.
348. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). However, three of the five
justices who joined Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Payne subsequently evidenced
more respect for stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2796
(1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, with Blackmun and
Stevens).
349. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
350. Id. at 1379-81.
351. See id. at 1383-85. Relying on Grady, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had
reversed the convictions. Id. at 1381, rev'g 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1382.
354. See supra text accompanying note 334.
355. 493 U.S. 342 (1990), cited with approval in Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1382; see supra
text accompanying note 337.
[Vol. 44:411
48
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/2
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
However, the conspiracy count in Felix posed a much more serious
Grady problem. Some of the evidence of overt acts in furtherance of the
Oklahoma conspiracy was that Felix had attempted to set up a speed lab in
Missouri, which was precisely the conduct for which he had been convicted
in the earlier Missouri trial. Thus, the conspiracy prosecution appears
vulnerable under Grady's rule precluding a prosecution in which the
government, "to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted.""' Nonetheless, the Felix Court
sustained the conspiracy conviction, noting that "long antedating [Grady v.
Corbin and the cases on which it relied], and not questioned in any of them,
is the rule that a substantive crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime,
are not the 'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes.
" 117
The Court's rationale for the conspiracy exception to Grady's same-
conduct definition of same offense is one that the Court had employed
previously. Definitions of "same offense" that are appropriate for double
jeopardy purposes in the context of relatively simple crimes, such as car
theft with its lesser included offense of joyriding,358 and some form of
involuntary manslaughter with lesser included traffic offenses, 359 are
inappropriate for more complex statutory crimes, such as continuing
criminal enterprises." The conduct involved in a conspiracy is typically
not simple, but is "multilayered . . .as to time and space. "361 While lesser
included offense analysis may be "useful in the context of a 'single course
of conduct,' [it] is . . .much less helpful in analyzing subsequent conspiracy
prosecutions that are supported by previously prosecuted overt acts, just as
it falls short in examining [continuing criminal enterprise] offenses that are
based on previously prosecuted predicate acts. "362
The net effect of Felix appeared to be: (1) that Grady's same-conduct
definition of same offense would remain in tact for relatively simple crimes;
(2) that Grady's same-conduct rule is definitely not a "same evidence" rule,
so that Dowling v. United States363 survives; and (3) that because Grady's
356. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), quoted in Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1383,
and overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
357. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1384.
358. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
359. See Grady, 495 U.S. 508; Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
360. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 789 (1985) (construing 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (1988) (now codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 859, 860, 861 (Supp. m 1991)), cited in
Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1385.
361. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1385 (citing Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789).
362. Id. (citing Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789).
363. 493 U.S. 342 (1990); see supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text.
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same-conduct test is not applicable to the complex crime of conspiracy, it
probably would be held inapplicable to other complex crimes.
61
364. An example of a complex crime is engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise
(CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). A person engages in a CCE by committing certain drug
offenses when "such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations ... which are
undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to
whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other
position of management."'.21 U.S.C. § 848 (c)(2).
In Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), the Court concluded that the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit the government from using a criminal act, of
which the defendant had previously been convicted, as evidence that a subsequent crime
was a part of a continuing series of violations in order to convict the defendant of
engaging in a CCE. Id. at 794-95. Garrett predates Grady's same-conduct definition of
same offense, and the result in Garrett appears to conflict with a literal application of
Grady barring the use of evidence of conduct for which the defendant has been
previously prosecuted. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. Nonetheless, the Felix Court's
reliance on Garrett as support for the conclusion that Grady's same-conduct rule is
inapplicable to conspiracy prosecutions strongly suggests that the same-conduct rule
would have been inapplicable to CCE prosecutions as well. See Felix, 112 S. Ct. at
1385.
Another significant complex crime that posed substantial double jeopardy problems
in light of Grady's same-conduct rule is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991). Substantial literature describing various
aspects of RICO is available. A useful introduction to RICO is available in Stephen D.
Brown & Alan M. Lieberman, RICO Basics: A Primer, 35 ViLL. L. Rv. 865 (1990).
For a comprehensive critique of the statute, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of
Being a Criminal (pts. 1-4), 87 COLuM. L. REv. 661 (1987), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920
(1987); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 774 (1988); Gerard E. Lynch, A Reply to Michael
Goldsmith, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 802 (1988). The RICO/Grady v. Corbin double jeopardy
issue is analyzed in Ramona L. McGee, Note, Criminal RICO and Double Jeopardy
Analysis in the Wake of Grady v. Corbin: Is this RICO's Achilles' Heel?, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 687 (1992), and Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Double Jeopardy Defense to
Separate or Successive Prosecutions Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.S. § 1962), 108 A.L.R. FED. 594 (1992).
The basis of the substantive RICO offense involves deriving income from a pattern
of racketeering activity, using that income in certain ways, or using a pattern of
racketeering activity to achieve certain ends. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). A pattern of
racketeering activity is "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred ... within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Racketeering activity includes nine state substantive
offenses-murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, and dealing in narcotics-as well as thirty-five separate federal offenses.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 11 1991). The government must prove the existence of
at least two of the enumerated offenses, known as "predicates," to establish the pattern
of racketeering activity requisite to a RICO violation.
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At the end of the October 1992 term, Grady v. Corbins65 was over-
ruled by United States v. Dixon.366 Resolving the only question on which
certiorari had been granted, the Dixon Court first held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. 67 Then,
by a five-to-four vote the Court rejected Grady's same-conduct test as
confusing and historically insupportable.
61
Dixon consists of two consolidated cases. In the first case, Alvin Dixon
was released on bail under the condition that he not commit "any criminal
offense" pending his trial for second degree murder. Subsequently, he was
arrested and indicted for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was
found guilty of criminal contempt for violating the condition of his release
by having possessed the drugs with intent to distribute them. The trial court
later dismissed the cocaine indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 69
In the second case, Michael Foster's wife, Ana Foster, secured a civil
protection order (CPO) requiring him not to "molest, assault, or in any
manner threaten or physically abuse" her.37 Subsequently, she filed
motions to have him held in contempt for numerous violations of the CPO
including, among others, threats on dates a, b, and c and assaults on dates
d and e, the assault on the latter date being particularly severe. At a hearing
prosecuted by Ana Foster's counsel, the court informed her that she must
"'prove as an element, first that there was a Civil Protection Order, and
The Grady double jeopardy issue is readily apparent. A literal application of the
same-conduct rule would bar a RICO prosecution if one or more of the predicate offenses
represents conduct for which the defendant has previously been prosecuted. However,
given the Court's reliance on Garrett, the pre-Grady CCE case, to justify the conspiracy
exception to the same-conduct rule in Felix, it seems likely that the Court would again
limit the same-conduct rule to relatively simple crimes and find no Grady barriers to a
RICO prosecution.
At least one commentator suggests this outcome. See McGee, supra, at 722. McGee
observes that a RICO sequence in which the RICO violation is prosecuted first and the
predicate offenses later, would not appear to pose same-conduct rule problems. Id. at
716. McGee's conclusion is supported by the Court's subsequent decision in Felix that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar prosecution for conduct, evidence of which had
been admitted in an earlier trial to establish an element of some other offense. See Felix,
112 S. Ct. at 1382-83.
365. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849
(1993).
366. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
367. Id. at 2855-56; see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
368. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860. This part of Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
369. Id. at 2853.
370. Id. at 2854.
1993]
51
McAninch: Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
then [that] . . . the assault as defined by the criminal code, in fact oc-
curred. '"371 Michael Foster was acquitted of contempt on, among other
counts, the threats on dates a, b, and c and convicted of contempt on,
among other counts, the assaults on dates d and e. Later he was indicted for
threatening to injure or kidnap on dates a, b, and c, simple assault on date
d, and assault with intent to kill on date e. The trial court denied his double
jeopardy claim.
372
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals consolidated Michael
Foster's appeal with the government's appeal in Dixon. Relying on Grady,
the court of appeals held that both subsequent prosecutions were barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause.373
Having concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to criminal
contempt proceedings, the Court had to determine whether the subsequent
prosecutions were for the same offenses as those in the contempt prosecu-
tions. Because the same conduct-Dixon's possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute, and Foster's threats and assaults-was involved in the two sets
of prosecutions, the Court noted that Grady's same-conduct test dictated a
finding of double jeopardy. 374 However, the Court decided to overrule the
three-year-old case.375
Justice Scalia, speaking for five members of the Court, and Justice
Souter, speaking for four,376 differed sharply over the existence of prece-
dent supporting the same-conduct test. Much of their disagreement focused
on In re Nielsen,31 which Scalia characterized simply as a Blockburger v.
United States37S-type case in which prosecution for a greater offense was
held to bar subsequent prosecution for a lesser included offense.379
Souter insisted that Scalia overlooked the fact that the subsequent
prosecution in Nielsen was not for a lesser included offense because the later
charged offense contained an additional element that the offense in the first
prosecution did not.38 Consequently, although the subsequent prosecution
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
374. Id. at 2859-60.
375. Id. at 2860.
376. While only Justice Stevens joined Justices Souter's opinion, both Justices White
and Blackmun indicated their agreement with Souter's conclusion. Id. at 2869 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2880 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
377. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
378. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
379. DiMon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-61.
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would have been allowed under Blockburger, the Nielsen Court must have
been using a same-conduct-type test to find the later prosecution barred."'
The two justices also disagreed about whether Grady's same-conduct test
had proved confusing and difficult to apply. 3"
The crux of Souter's opinion is that, while the Blockburger test serves
well as a guide to legislative intent about the authorization for multiple
punishments in a single prosecution, it is sometimes inadequate to provide
necessary protection against successive prosecutions, "the central protection
provided by the Clause."383
He demonstrated Blockburger's inadequacy with a hypothetical of a
one's having committed an armed robbery in a dwelling.3" Three related
offenses might be charged: simple robbery, robbery in a dwelling, or armed
robbery. Simple robbery is a lesser included offense of the other two.
However, both robbery in a dwelling and armed robbery contain an element
that the other does not. Consequently, Blockburger would allow a prosecu-
tion for either one of them followed by a separate prosecution for the other,
even though based on the same act of robbery. Souter argued that the second
prosecution, which would be barred by the same-conduct test, would
undermine the central purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause of guarding
against successive prosecutions which give the government the opportunity
to rehearse its case and to wear down the defendant.
38
Scalia offered an example based on an eighteenth-century English case
to demonstrate that under the common law a subsequent prosecution has
never been barred if the two prosecutions involved offenses each of which
requires proof of an element that the other does not.386 Scalia did not
address Souter's concern that the subsequent prosecution in such a case may
381. See id. at 2887. In Nielsen the defendant, a Mormon, was first convicted of
cohabiting with more than one woman and was later prosecuted for adultery. Scalia read
Nielson as assuming that adultery was an element of cohabitation, so that the former
crime was a lesser included offense of the latter. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-61.
Souter read Nielson as recognizing that adultery required proof that one of the
partners was married to another person, while this requirement was not an element of
cohabitation. Because both adultery and cohabitation required proof of an element that
the other did not, the former was not a lesser included offense of the later. Id. at 2884-86
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justices Scalia and Souter also disagreed about the significance of more modem
cases, especially Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433
U.S. 682 (1977). See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2861; id. at 2887 (Souter, J.).
382. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2864 n.16; id. at 2889 (Souter, J.).
383. Id. at 2882.
384. Id. at 2883-84.
385. Id. at 2884.
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undercut the Double Jeopardy Clause's "central protection."
Dixon might be thought to smooth the troubled waters of double
jeopardy by eliminating Grady's same-conduct test in favor of the easier to
apply, same-elements test of Blockburger. To the contrary, Dixon roils these
waters.
In order even to get to the issue of Grady's same-conduct test, the
Dixon Court had to apply the Blockburger test to the facts of the case. When
it did, Scalia lost his five-vote majority. While all five agreed that
Blockburger did not bar the subsequent prosecution of four of the counts
against Foster, only Justice Kennedy agreed with Scalia that Blockburger
barred prosecution of the other count against Foster and the sole count
against Dixon. Indeed, writing for the three justices who abandoned that part
of Scalia's opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "Justice Scalia's
double-jeopardy analysis bears a striking resemblance to that found in
Grady-not what one would expect in an opinion that overrules Grady."" 7
Scalia observed that Dixon's court order enjoined Dixon from
committing any offense in the entire governing criminal code. Dixon was
found guilty of contempt only on proof that he had committed an offense,
specifically possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Scalia then
reasoned that the substantive drug offense became "'a species of lesser-
included offense'" of the contempt offense because each element of the
substantive drug offense was included in the contempt offense."'
Similarly, Foster's contempt conviction for violating the civil protection
order forbidding him from committing assault precluded a subsequent
prosecution for simple assault because each element of the simple assault
offense was included in the earlier contempt prosecution." 9
Conversely, Scalia reasoned, Blockburger does not bar subsequent
prosecution of the other counts against Foster. Applying the same-elements
test in a technical manner, Scalia noted that Foster had been ordered not to
"'molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or abuse' his wife." 3" A
contempt conviction required proof of a willful violation of the CPO, the
elements of which were knowledge of the CPO and violation of one of its
387. Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined
by Justices O'Connor and Thomas).
388. Id. at 2857 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980)) (discussing
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)).
389. Id. at 2858. Although only Justice Kennedy joined this part of Scalia's opinion,
all four of the justices who voted not to overrule Grady agreed that the Double Jeopardy
Clause precluded the subsequent prosecution of Dixon for the drug offense and Foster
for simple assault. Of course these four disagreed with Scalia as to the other counts
against Foster, which they found to be barred; however, Scalia, this time writing for five
members of the Court, did not.
390. Id. at 2858.
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provisions-e.g., giving a threat. The elements of the subsequently
prosecuted offense, threats to injure or kidnap, required the specific element
that the threat be of a particular type. Thus, the offenses of contempt and
threat to injury or kidnap each contain an element that the other does not;
the former requires knowledge of the CPO, and the latter, that the threat be
to injure or kidnap. Consequently, the successive prosecutions are not
barred by Blockburger.391
Similarly, the earlier contempt prosecution for violation of the CPO
against assault is not the same offense as, and would not bar a subsequent
prosecution for, assault with intent to kill. The former requires proof of
knowledge of the CPO, and the latter, proof of the intent to kill.3"
Justice White, writing for himself and Justice Stevens on this point,
characterized Scalia's analysis of the non-jeopardy-barred offenses as
formalistic and "divorced from the purposes of the constitutional provision
he purports to apply."" White argued that the basic purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect a defendant from having to defend
himself twice on the same charge.3"
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, found all of the subsequent
charges barred under Grady's same-conduct test.319
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
disagreed with Scalia about the impact of Blockburger on Dixon's subse-
quent drug prosecution and on Foster's subsequent simple assault prosecu-
tion. Rehnquist found neither of them barred. He asserted that proper Block-
burger analysis requires a court to focus on the elements of contempt in the
ordinary sense, and not on the terms of the particular court orders involved:
"Because the generic crime of contempt of court has different elements than
the substantive criminal charges in this case, I believe that they are separate
offenses under Blockburger."396 Rehnquist complained that Scalia's focus
on the facts necessary to show a violation of the specific court orders, rather
than on the generic elements of the crime of contempt of court, is really a
type of quasi-Grady analysis.3"
The net effect of Dixon is that Grady has been overruled, leaving
Blockburger as the sole test of same offense for successive prosecutions, as
well as for multiple punishments in a single prosecution. How Blockburger
is to be applied in successive prosecution cases, however, appears far from
391. Id. at 2858-59.
392. Id. at 2859.
393. Id. at 2874 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
394. Id. at 2876.
395. Id. at 2890-91 (Souter, J.).
396. Id. at 2865. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
397. Id. at 2866-67.
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settled. To what extent must the facts and elements of the crime charged in
the earlier prosecution be considered? Grady's same-conduct test had
afforded some guidance here; the split opinions in Dixon do not.
2. South Carolina Cases
The application of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause to
the states in Benton v. Maryland"8 did not alter South Carolina's tradition-
al interpretation that "the provisions against double jeopardy apply only to
a second prosecution for the same act and crime, both in law and fact, for
which the first prosecution was instituted."" The test was "whether the
evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been
sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first indictment.""
Prior to 1986 the South Carolina courts, relying on Blockburger v.
United States4o' and Brown v. Ohio4m as additional guides, implemented
the Hoffman test to invalidate subsequent prosecutions for lesser included
offenses of crimes for which defendants had already been tried,4 3 and to
uphold successive prosecutions when the two offenses have different
elements. 404
Prior to Brown the South Carolina Supreme Court had observed a rule
that conviction of a lesser included offense in a court of limited jurisdiction
would not bar subsequent prosecution in a court of general sessions for a
greater offense that was beyond the jurisdiction of the former court.4 5 The
398. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
399. State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 326, 175 S.E.2d 227, 230 (1970) (sustaining a
conviction for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature following an earlier
municipal court conviction of disorderly conduct based on the same facts).
400. State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 466, 186 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1972) (sustaining
a conviction for failure to stop for a flashing light following municipal court acquittals
of creating excessive noise in the operation of a motorcycle and of operating a
motorcycle too fast for conditions).
401. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
402. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
403. See State v. Dunbar, 282 S.C. 169, 171, 318 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1984) (dictum)
(stating that acquittal of housebreaking would preclude subsequent prosecution for the
lesser included offense of entering without breaking).
404. See State v. Norton, 286 S.C. 95, 96-97, 332 S.E.2d 531, 532-533 (1985)
(holding that acquittal for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor is not a bar
to subsequent prosecution for lewd acts on a minor, because each offense requires proof
of a fact that the other does not).
405. See State v. Butler, 230 S.C. 159, 94 S.E.2d 761 (1956) (holding that conviction
in municipal court of illegally firing a shotgun did not bar subsequent prosecution for
assault and battery with intent to kill), overruled by State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 397
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court has also noted the traditional rule that "only one prosecution is
permissible for a continuing offense."" Moreover, the court has taken
care to determine whether an activity charged as a separate conspiracy was
in fact part of another conspiracy for which the defendant had already been
prosecuted. 407
Anticipating the holding in Grady v. Corbin, 4 8 in 1986 in State v.
Grampus' the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a test similar to the
same-conduct definition of same offense when dealing with successive
prosecutions. Relying on the dictum in Illinois v. Vitale,410 the Grampus
court concluded that a felony driving-under-the-influence (DUI) prosecution
was precluded by an earlier magistrate court conviction for improper lane
change arising from the same accident. 41 1 Evidence of the improper lane
change, conduct for which the defendant had already been prosecuted, was
crucial to establishing an essential element of felony DUI: that while driving
under the influence, the defendant did an act forbidden by law which caused
injury or death to another person.412 The defendant's conviction for
improper lane change could not be used to establish an element of felony
DUI because doing so would subject the defendant to double jeopardy. In
other words, the improper lane change caused the head-on collision.
413
Why the court elected to implement the same-conduct test some six
years after Vitale is unclear. Just one year before Grampus, the court
affirmed a successive prosecution that the same-conduct test would have
prohibited. 4 4 At any rate, after 1986 the same-conduct test was well
established in South Carolina.4 5 Post-Grady, pre-Dixon South Carolina
cases have naturally relied on Grady.4"6
n.3, 343 S.E.2d 26, 27 n.3 (1986).
406. State v. Hess, 279 S.C. 525, 529, 309 S.E.2d 741, 743 (misconduct in office),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983).
407. See State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 454, 298 S.E.2d 215 (1982).
408. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
409. 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986).
410. 447 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1980).
411. Grampus, 288 S.C. at 396-97, 343 S.E.2d at 26-27.
412. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2945 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
413. Grampus, 288 S.C. at 397, 343 S.E.2d at 27.
414. See State v. Norton, 286 S.C. 95, 332 S.E.2d 531 (1985).
415. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987) (holding that a
DUI conviction in magistrate's court should have precluded subsequent prosecution for
reckless homicide based on the same conduct).
416. See, e.g., State v. Magazine, 302 S.C. 55, 58, 393 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1990)
(holding that a criminal contempt sanction precludes subsequent prosecution for assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature). For a discussion of the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt, see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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Relying on Grady v. Corbin and United States v. Felix,417 the court
in State v. Owens418 concluded that a prior kidnapping conviction did not
preclude a subsequent prosecution for murdering the kidnapped victim.
419
As was observed in Felix, Grady does not necessarily preclude using the
same evidence in successive prosecutions.42 Furthermore, as the Owens
court noted, kidnapping is not an essential element of murder. 421 Finally,
important evidence in the murder prosecution in Owens-the defendant's
inculpatory statements made to fellow inmates-did not exist prior to the
kidnapping trial.422
The South Carolina Supreme Court most recently addressed the same-
conduct test in State v. Wilson,422 concluding that a prior acquittal on a
charge of cocaine trafficking did not bar a subsequent conviction of
marijuana trafficking. Employing a technically correct Grady-type analysis,
the court found that the conduct in the earlier cocaine case was not used to
establish an element of the later marijuana case.424
The two appellants in Wilson, Walter and Steve, father and son, were
originally indicted in the cocaine case with two other family members,
Ronnie and Teresa. At the same time, Ronnie and Teresa were also indicted
for trafficking more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Ronnie and Teresa were
found guilty on both trafficking counts. Only after Walter and Steve were
acquitted on the cocaine trafficking charge were they indicted for trafficking
more than 100 pounds of marijuana along with Ronnie, Teresa, and others
who had also been charged with Ronnie and Teresa in the earlier marijuana
indictment.42
As both the concurring426 and dissenting427 justices in Wilson em-
phasized, the crux of the double jeopardy issue depends upon whether the
As discussed previously, the United States Supreme Court recently decided that the
Double Jeopardy Clause applies to non-summary criminal contempt prosecutions. United
States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993); see supra note 100.
417. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
418. 424 S.E.2d 473 (S.C. 1992).
419. Id. at 475-76.
420. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1382-83, cited in Owens, 424 S.E.2d at 475.
421. Owens, 424 S.E.2d at 476.
422. Id.
423. 429 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 1993).
424. Id. at 454-55. The court also found no collateral estoppel violation, as per Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 432 (1970), although the court did not discuss what might have
prompted the acquittal in the earlier cocaine trafficking trial. Wilson, 429 S.E.2d at 456.
Ashe is discussed supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
425. Wilson, 429 S.E.2d at 453-54.
426. Id. at 457 (Toal, J., concurring).
427. Id. at 459 (Finney, J., dissenting).
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drug trafficking involved two conspiracies or only one. If the trafficking in
cocaine and marijuana were part of a single conspiracy to engage in drug
trafficking, then the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar Walter's and Steve's
second prosecution. 428 The majority recognized the issue, but treated it as
a matter of pleading, noting that "in Dasher the defendants were charged in
both prosecutions with a general conspiracy to violate the Controlled
Substances Act. "429 In contrast, Wilson concerned a cocaine trafficking
conspiracy 43 charge followed by a marijuana trafficking conspiracy"
charge. Because "[e]ach conspiracy offense is statutorily defined by what
controlled substance is the object of the agreement[, tihe State . . . has
alleged two separate conspiracies requiring different proof. "432
Justice Toal observed that under the majority's analysis, if two persons
agreed to import two different drugs, but did nothing else, each could face
a conspiracy charge for one drug, followed by another prosecution for a
conspiracy regarding the other drug.433 Similarly, according to the
majority's analysis, an agreement to break into a house and steal something
could support serial prosecutions for each thief for two separate conspiracies
because each conspiracy would be defined by a separate code offense. Yet,
in both hypotheticals there is only a single conspiracy.
Justice Toal concluded that on the facts of Wilson two separate
conspiracies had occurred. Consequently, she concurred in the result
reached by the majority, that the marijuana charge was not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.434 Justice Finney dissented, finding a single
conspiracy involving the same key principals and overlapping dates, as in
Dasher.
435
In State v. Amerson,436 a conspiracy case decided the same day as
Wilson, the court affirmed the trial court's conclusions that a prosecution for
conspiracy to traffic marijuana was barred by an earlier acquittal in another
marijuana trafficking conspiracy case. Justice Toal, writing for a unanimous
court, emphasized that the essence of a conspiracy is the agreement and that
the agreement is typically established by proof of overt acts committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy." Because a single conspiracy can be
428. See State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 454, 456, 298 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1982).
429. Wilson, 429 S.E.2d at 455.
430. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e)(2)(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
431. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e)(1)(b).
432. Wilson, 429 S.E.2d at 455-56.
433. Id. at 458 (Toal, J., concurring).
434. Id. at 456.
435. Id. at 459 (Finney, J., dissenting).
436. 428 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. 1993).
437. Id. at 873.
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established by different aggregations of proof, a single conspiracy might
appear to be several conspiracies. 438 Applying a multi-pronged, flexible,
totality of the circumstances test,439 the court affirmed the trial court's
findings that a single conspiracy had occurred and that the Double Jeopardy
Clause thus barred the second prosecution. 440
In State v. Jeffries"' the South Carolina Court of Appeals concluded
that a prosecution for willful abandonment of a child did not preclude a
subsequent kidnapping prosecution when the kidnapper stole a car with an
infant in the back seat and later left the infant behind a store. The court
reasoned that kidnapping is not a continuing offense and that freeing the
victim, the conduct involved in the earlier abandonment charge, is not an
essential element of kidnapping." 2
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by prosecution for conduct
which happens to coincide with other conduct that was the subject of an
earlier prosecution. Thus, in State v. Clarke 3 an acquittal for improper
lane change did not preclude a subsequent prosecution for unlawful
possession of a pistol that the police officer observed during the traffic
stop. 4 Nor is double jeopardy imposed by successive prosecutions for
separate violations of the same or related statutes. 45
In State v. Johnson"6 the court applied the same-conduct test in a
rather technical manner to conclude that a prosecution under the Habitual
Traffic Offender Act (HTO)"7 is not barred by an earlier trial for driving
438. Id. (citing United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1988)).
439. Id. The Amerson court stated:
The factors considered are (1) the time periods covered by the alleged
conspiracies; (2) the places where the conspiracies are alleged to have
occurred; (3) the persons charged as conspirators; (4) the overt acts alleged
to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracies, or any other
descriptions of the offenses charged which indicate the nature and scope of the
activities being prosecuted; and (5) the substantive statutes alleged to have
been violated.
Id. (citing Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184).
440. Id. at 873-74.
441. 304 S.C. 141, 403 S.E.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 112
S. Ct. 1464 (1992).
442. Id. at 145, 403 S.E.2d at 171.
443. 302 S.C. 423, 396 S.E.2d 827 (1990).
444. Id. at 436, 396 S.E.2d at 828.
445. See, e.g., State v. Dowey, 307 S.C. 69, 413 S.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that a cocaine trafficking prosecution was not precluded by earlier conviction
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute when based on different instances of
conduct).
446. 299 S.C. 130, 382 S.E.2d 909 (1989) (per curiam).
447. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1100 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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under suspension (DUS)." 8 HTO involves driving while one's license is
suspended by the Highway Department, but DUS requires driving while
prohibited by judgment of a court."49 Regardless of what governmental
entity was responsible for revoking the defendant's authority to drive, the
HTO offense seems to involve conduct-driving a vehicle without proper
authority-for which the defendant had been previously prosecuted.
In neither Vitale nor Grady was each element of the subsequent
homicide prosecution encompassed within the earlier traffic offense
charge.450 The touchstone of the same-conduct test is that if any essential
element of the subsequent offense depends upon proof of conduct for which
the defendant has already been prosecuted, the latter charge is barred.451
However, if each and every element of the subsequent charge must be
encompassed in the conduct prosecuted in the earlier charge, then the court
is actually applying a Blockburger same-elements test, not a Grady same-
conduct test.
Will the South Carolina Supreme Court abandon the same-conduct test
following Grady's demise? Given that South Carolina adopted this test some
four years before Grady was decided,452 and in order to reduce turbulence
in this area of the law,453 the same-conduct test might be retained as a
function of South Carolina law.454 The answer will depend on how impor-
tant the South Supreme courts determine the test is in serving the underlying
purposes of the protection against double jeopardy.455
448. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-460.
449. Johnson, 299 S.C. at 132, 382 S.E.2d at 910. As a pre-Grady case, Johnson
relied on Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), as well as the earlier South Carolina
cases of State v. Grampus, 228 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1980), and State v. Carter,
291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987).
450. See supra text accompanying note 318 (discussing Vitale); supra text accompany-
ing note 324 (discussing Grady).
451. See supra text accompanying notes 332-333.
452. See Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26. An attorney's advice on double
jeopardy given in 1989, after Grampus, but before Grady, was held to be ineffective
assistance of counsel for not encompassing the same-conduct rule. Jivers v. State, 304
S.C. 556, 560, 406 S.E.2d 154, 156-57 (1991).
453. In adopting the same-conduct test, Grampus overruled State v. Butler, 230 S.C.
159, 94 S.E.2d 761 (1956).
454. The court in Grampus relied on the Fifth Amendment as construed in dictum in
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421 (1980), but did not mention the state constitution's
double jeopardy provision, S.C. CONST. art. I, § 12. Since the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause was held applicable to the states in 1969, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has not interpreted the state's double jeopardy provision in a manner
independent from that of the Fifth Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 45-
47.
455. In his dissenting opinion in Dixon, Justice Souter forcibly presented the
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The same-conduct test does have costs for law enforcement. Moreover,
coordinating prosecutions in magistrates courts and general sessions courts
is imperative to ensure that the trials of petty misdemeanors do not preclude
subsequent serious felony trials.4"6 Additionally, the same-conduct test
would appear to annul the statutory authorization for reindictment and trial
following an acquittal based on a variance between indictment and
proof.
4 7
VI. REPROSECUTION FOLLOWING MISTRIAL
A. Introduction
In addition to precluding retrial following acquittal or conviction for the
same offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the defendant's "'valued
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' "458 Because
jeopardy attaches before a judgment becomes final, 459 a defendant whose
prior prosecution was terminated without either conviction or acquittal faces
double jeopardy upon retrial. Determining when the subsequent trial violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause under such circumstances is the subject of this
Part of the Article.
importance of the same-conduct test in serving these underlying purposes in the context
of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2890 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see supra text accompanying
notes 383-385.
456. As the Court noted in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 n.7 (1990), overruled
by Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, an exception to the same-conduct rule might apply if the
prosecution exercised due diligence, but was unaware, at the time of the initial trial on
the lesser offense, of the existence of facts that would constitute the greater offense. See
supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text. In this regard it is interesting to note that
in Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26, in which the court adopted the same-conduct
rule, defendant's counsel suggested to the solicitor's office that the traffic citations and
the felony DUI charge be pursued in the same trial. However, because the charges were
prosecuted in different trials, the Grampus court held that the trial for the former charges
invalidated the conviction for the latter charges. Id. at 396, 343 S.E.2d at 26.
457. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); see supra notes 187-195 and
accompanying text. In State v. Gowan, 178 S.C. 78, 182 S.E. 159 (1935), the court
directed a verdict of not guilty because of a variance between proof and indictment as
to the location of the murder victim's demise, after which the defendant was reindicted
and convicted. The Gowan court rejected the plea of autrefois acquit. Id. at 81, 182 S.E.
at 160. Under the same-conduct test the defendant could not have been tried again for
having inflicted the mortal blow.
458. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
459. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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The Court has explained why this "valued right" merits constitutional
protection:
Even if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be
grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the
accused, prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unre-
solved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an
innocent defendant may be convicted.W
The last concern enumerated in this quotation arises from the State's
opportunity to perfect its presentation of evidence, treating the earlier
aborted proceeding as a dress rehearsal. 46' A related concern is that a
prosecutor, sensing that the State's case is proceeding poorly, might move
for a mistrial in order to avoid potential acquittal.462
Because the defendant's right to have the trial completed by the first
tribunal is necessarily frustrated by retrial following an involuntary mistrial,
the prosecutor must justify the mistrial in order to avoid the Double
Jeopardy Clause's bar to the subsequent prosecution. 463 The mistrial is
justified if "there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public
justice would otherwise be defeated. "41
B. Voluntary and Consensual Mistrials
The manifest-necessity standard for mistrials46 is inapplicable when
the mistrial is granted at the defendant's request or with his consent.4s
460. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
461. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (holding that collateral estoppel
precluded a subsequent prosecution for armed robbery of one victim following acquittal
on a robbery charge of another victim during the same hold-up; the State conceded that
it had treated the first trial as a dry run for the second).
462. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (prosecutor requested
mistrial when important witnesses whom he had been unable to subpoena failed to
appear).
In tracing the evolution of double jeopardy jurisprudence from the common-law rule
against the discharge of juries to the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, Justice
Powell noted the importance of the common-law rule against the Crown's "tyrannical
practice" in the 17th-century "of discharging juries and permitting reindictment when
acquittal appeared likely." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 42-43 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
463. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505.
464. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
465. See infra part VI.C.
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When confronted with potentially prejudicial prosecutorial or judicial error,
the defendant has two options. The defendant can hope for an acquittal by
the jury in spite of the error; if convicted, the defendant can seek reversal
on appeal and face a retrial. Alternatively, the defendant can request a
mistrial, necessarily forfeiting his right to have the case decided by the
particular tribunal. The second option provides the defendant a more
immediate retrial without having had to face the expense, anxiety, and delay
incident to an appeal of the conviction.
If retrials following voluntary mistrials were subject to the manifest-
necessity standard, courts would be less likely to grant voluntary mistrials.
Consequently, the defendant's "primary control over the course to be
followed in the event of such error"4 67 would be undermined. In United
States v. Dinitz the Court recognized that "traditional waiver concepts have
little relevance where the defendant must determine whether or not to
request or consent to a mistrial in response to judicial or prosecutorial
error. "463 The net effect of Dinitz is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar retrial following a voluntary mistrial; therefore, the State need not
establish manifest necessity to justify the mistrial.469
The Dinitz consent rule applies not only when the defendant requests
the mistrial, as in Dinitz, but also when the defendant consents to the judge's
stated intention to declare a mistrial.470 Consent is easily inferred when the
defendant has requested a mistrial on grounds that are the same as, or
related to, the grounds on which the mistrial is ultimately declared.4
Some courts have inferred consent simply from the defendant's failure to
object, in spite of adequate opportunity, to the court's sua sponte declaration
of mistrial, even though the defendant was not explicitly advised of the
judge's intention to declare a mistrial. 472 Commentators have crit-
icized,473 and some courts have rejected,474 the readiness to infer consent
467. Id. at 609.
468. Id. The Court rejected the appellate court's conclusion that the defendant had "no
choice but to move for or accept a mistrial." Id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 492
F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane)).
469. Reasoning similar to that in Dinitz has been used to justify retrial following a
post-jeopardy dismissal granted at the defendant's request on grounds unrelated to factual
guilt or innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-101 (1978),
discussed supra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 387 N.E.2d 325 (II1.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 940 (1979).
471. See, e.g., United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 815 (1987); Carey, 387 N.E.2d at 329.
472. See, e.g., United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1991).
473. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 536
(1977), cited in 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 68-69.
474. See, e.g., United States v. White, 914 F.2d 747,753-54 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
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to a mistrial from the defendant's failure to object.
In Dinitz the trial court expelled one of the defendant's attorneys from
the case for repeated improprieties in the opening statement and gave the
defendant three options: (1) a stay or recess pending appellate review of the
propriety of the expulsion; (2) continuation of the trial with co-counsel; or
(3) declaration of a mistrial following which the defendant could obtain
other counsel for the retrial. 75 The defendant opted for a mistrial, and the
Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar
reprosecution. 476
No evidence indicated that the judge had expelled defense counsel in
bad faith to provoke the defendant into requesting a mistrial or to prejudice
the defendant's prospects for an acquittal.477 However, the Court opined
that the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude retrial of a defendant
provoked or harassed into requesting a mistrial.478
In Oregon v. Kennedy479 the Court clarified Dinitz's dictum concern-
ing a defendant goaded into requesting a mistrial. The Kennedy Court
explicitly recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial of
a defendant whose mistrial request is granted when "the conduct giving rise
to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant
into moving for a mistrial."4 0 The Court emphasized the narrowness of
the exception to the general rule that a voluntary mistrial will not bar retrial
with the following observation: "Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed
as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on
defendant's motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part
of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. "41
Because the burden of proving the improper prosecutorial motivation
is on the defendant,482 the test is very rigorous. A defendant alleging that
that defendant's failure to object to co-defendant's motion for mistrial was insufficient
to constitute consent to mistrial, especially when counsel lacked a reasonable opportunity
to consider the issue).
475. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1104 (1977).
476. Id. at 611-12.
477. Id. at 611.
478. Id. (dictum).
479. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
480. Id. at 679.
481. Id. at 675-76.
482. Id. at 683-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). When a mistrial is
granted other than pursuant to the defendant's request or with the defendant's consent,
the prosecutor has the burden of establishing manifest necessity for the mistrial. Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
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the prosecutor sensed a likely acquittal and engaged in intentional miscon-
duct to prompt the defendant to request a mistrial would have a difficult
time rebutting the claim that the prosecutor's misconduct was designed to
encourage the jury to convict, not to prompt the defendant to move for
mistrial.4  Speaking for four members of the Court in Kennedy, Justice
Stevens advocated a less rigorous, more objective standard: "It is sufficient
that the court is persuaded that egregious prosecutorial misconduct has
rendered unmeaningful the defendant's choice to continue or to abort the
proceeding. "4
Justice Powell, a member of the Kennedy majority, attempted to
mediate the difference between the two competing standards by observing
that the prosecutorial intent could be established by reference to objective
factors. 41 Nonetheless, as one commentator has observed, "[t]he circuits
have been reluctant to find the intent necessary to satisfy the Kennedy
standard. "486
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in Kennedy, noted that the
Court's opinion did not preclude the state court from concluding on remand
that state constitutional double jeopardy provisions prohibited retrial.487 On
remand the Oregon Supreme Court followed Justice Brennan's suggestion
and adopted a less rigorous test for its state double jeopardy clause. The
Oregon court held that retrial would be barred by the state constitution
"when improper official conduct is so prejudicial to the defendant that it
cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial, and if the official knows that
the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is indifferent
to the resulting mistrial or reversal. "48 The Oregon court concluded,
however, that the prosecutorial misconduct in the case before it did not bar
a retrial.489
Courts in other states, such as Arizona and Massachusetts, have adopted
483. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
484. Id. at 689. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
485. Id. at 679-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
486. Clauson, supra note 12, at 1301 n.1457 (citing, among many other courts of
appeals decisions, United States v. Wentz, 800 F.2d 1325, 1327-28 (4th Cir. 1986)). The
Wentz court agreed with the trial court's assessment that the prosecutor lacked the intent
to goad the defendant into a mistrial request. The court of appeals noted that the
evidentiary hearing on the issue should precede the second trial in order to serve the
basic Double Jeopardy Clause protection against inappropriate successive prosecutions.
Wentz, 800 F.2d at 1328.
487. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
488. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (construing OR. CONST. art.
I, § 12).
489. Id. at 1327.
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tests similar to Oregon's test.4" The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
has concluded that misconduct, whether prosecutorial or judicial, precludes
retrial if the misconduct is intended to provoke a motion for mistrial or to
prejudice the defendant's prospects for an acquittal.49'
C. Mistrials Without the Defendant's Consent and the
Manifest-Necessity Standard
In United States v. Perez492 the Court concluded that retrial following
an earlier proceeding which was aborted before a verdict is not barred
whenever "there is a manifest necessity for [the discharge of the jury before
verdict], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." 4 3
The Perez Court did not refer to the Double Jeopardy Clause, but appears
to have been applying the common-law rule concerning discharge of
juries. 494 Nonetheless, the Perez manifest-necessity standard has become
the Double Jeopardy Clause test for retrial following a mistrial to which the
defendant did not consent. 495 The same standard had been used in South
Carolina well before the Double Jeopardy Clause was held applicable to the
states in 1969.496
The manifest-necessity test, described as "less than lucid" by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, 49 is perhaps incapable of precise formulation.
The Court has tried to clarify the test by defining the "ends of justice" as
490. See, e.g., Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1984) (en bane); Comm-
onwealth v. Murchison, 465 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1984).
491. State v. Berry, 470 A.2d 881, 883 (N.H. 1983), overruled by State v. Duhamel,
512 A.2d 420 (N.H. 1986).
492. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
493. Id. at 580.
494. In his dissent in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), Justice Powell traced the
development of rules against discharging juries to marshal support for his reading of
Perez. Id. at 42-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
495. E.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973).
496. See, e.g., State v. Bilton, 156 S.C. 324, 153 S.E. 269 (1930). As the Bilton
court observed:
"The American cases hold generally that there must be a manifest
necessity for the discharge of the jury and leave the courts to determine in
their discretion whether under all the circumstances of each case such
necessity exists. When such necessity exists, a plea of former jeopardy will
not prevail on a subsequent trial. But if the jury are discharged without
defendant's consent for a reason legally insufficient and without an absolute
necessity for it, the discharge is equivalent to an acquittal, and may be pleaded
as a bar to a subsequent indictment."
Id. at 342, 153 S.E. at 276 (quoting 16 C.J. Criminal Law § 394, at 250 (1918)).
497. State v. Prince, 279 S.C. 30, 33, 301 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1983).
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"the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."4 98
Later, the Court cautioned against a literal interpretation of "necessity,"
assuming "that there are degrees of necessity and we require a 'high degree'
before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate. "499 The test can be fully
understood only by considering the cases in which the test has been applied.
Perez involved retrial after discharge of a hung jury.50 After articu-
lating the famous test, the Court concluded, without explicit rationale, that
retrial would be permissible. 0 ' Intuitively the decision seems correct.
Justice demands resolution of criminal charges brought to trial; if a
particular jury cannot agree either to acquit or convict, it is manifestly
necessary that another jury must have the opportunity. Double jeopardy is
not violated: first, because no prior conviction or acquittal exists; and
second, because the defendant was deprived of the "valued right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal" " only because of that tribunal's
inability to complete the trial. Retrial following a hung jury might fail the
manifest-necessity standard, however, if the mistrial was declared too
quickly and without consideration of alternative resolutions to the im-
passe.
5 03
In United States v. Jorn 4 the trial judge's failure to consider alterna-
tives to mistrial was fatal to the government's retrial attempt. The govern-
ment planned to prove charges of willful assistance in the preparation of
false income tax returns by calling five taxpayers whose returns the
defendant had allegedly helped to prepare. When the first witness was
called, the judge advised him of his rights against self-incrimination, but
498. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1949).
499. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).
500. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
501. Id. at 580.
502. Wade, 336 U.S. at 689.
503. See, e.g., State v. Prince, 279 S.C. 30, 301 S.E.2d 471 (1983). In Prince, after
deliberating for five hours, the jury made a late evening request to have the testimony
of two witnesses read. After being told by the court reporter that reading the testimony
would take slightly more than two hours, the judge declared a mistrial over the
defendant's objection. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that there was no
manifest necessity for discharging the jury; therefore, retrial was barred. Id. at 33, 301
S.E.2d at 472-73. Because the jury had not indicated that it was hopelessly stuck, the
judge should have either granted the jury's request or recessed until the following
morning to begin reading the testimony.
A judge faces a dilemma when confronted with a jury having difficulty agreeing on
a verdict. As in Prince, dismissing the jury too soon may run afoul of the manifest-
necessity standard; yet, instructing the jury to try again may spawn a challenge that the
jury was coerced into convicting. But cf. State v. Tillman, 304 S.C. 512,405 S.E.2d 607
(Ct. App. 1991) (holding that supplemental instructions were not coercive).
504. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
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expressed incredulity at the witness's assertion that the Internal Revenue
Service had so advised him. Consequently, the judge refused to let the
witness testify before consulting with an attorney. Upon learning that the
other witnesses were similarly situated, the judge discharged the jury so that
the witnesses could consult with counsel. Before the scheduled retrial, the
judge dismissed the information on the ground of former jeopardy."°
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge on direct appeal. A
plurality concluded that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial,
noting that the trial judge gave no consideration to the possibility of a
continuance during which the witnesses might have consulted with counsel.
Consequently, the abrupt discharge of the jury was not an exercise of sound
discretion."° Justice Harlan, writing for the four-member plurality,
suggested that the manifest-necessity test represents a balancing of the
defendant's right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal against
a host of practical difficulties the government encounters in presenting its
case.5" The three dissenters in Jorn found no "'abuse' of the trial process
resulting in prejudice to the accused, by way of harassment or the like, such
as to outweigh society's interest in the punishment of crime. " "'
Consideration of alternatives to a mistrial is important in determining
whether manifest necessity for the mistrial exists. For example, in State v.
Kirby'09 the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge
properly granted a mistrial after the solicitor died in mid-trial. Manifest
necessity existed because the assistant solicitor had not been present during
the trial and was not in a proper emotional state to take over the case.510
Accordingly, retrial of the defendant was not double jeopardy."1
The Jorn dissenters relied on Gori v. United States,"2 a five-to-four
decision which concluded that retrial was not barred following a sua sponte
mistrial prompted by the government's questioning a witness in a manner
designed to bring out uncharged misconduct by the defendant. The Court in
Gori concluded that retrial following a mistrial granted to protect or benefit
the defendant was not the prohibited, oppressive use of successive prosecu-
tions.
513
505. Id. at 472-73.
506. Id. at 487.
507. Id. at 479-80; cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1949) (concluding that
the tactical problems of an army in the field justified discharge of one court-martial and
the subsequent commencement of another).
508. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 492 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
509. 269 S.C. 25, 236 S.E.2d-33 (1977).
510. Id. at 29-31, 236 S.E.2d at 35.
511. Id.
512. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
513. Id. at 369.
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The continued vitality of Gori is questionable. The plurality in Jorn
eschewed "bright-line rules based on either the source of the problem or the
intended beneficiary of the ruling."" 4 Moreover, in United States v.
Dinitz' 5 the Court observed, "[tihe important consideration, for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control
over the course to be followed in the event of such error."516 If a mistrial
is granted at the defendant's request, retrial ordinarily will not be
barred." 7 A mistrial granted without the defendant's consent, even if
motivated by a desire to protect the defendant from error, deprives him of
control over the course of the litigation. Therefore, such a mistrial is subject
to the manifest-necessity standard, including consideration of alternatives
such as cautionary instructions to the jury.
In addition, Downum v. United States"' and Illinois v. Somer-
ville,519 also five-to-four decisions, combine to defeat any notion of a
bright-line rule concerning mistrials caused by prosecutorial failings. In
Downum, after the jury was sworn, the prosecutor discovered that the key
witness in two of the four counts against the defendant was not present,
could not be located, and had not been subpoenaed. The defendant moved
for dismissal of two counts for want of prosecution and requested that the
trial continue on the remaining counts. The judge denied the motion and
discharged the jury over the defendant's objection. At a retrial two days
later, the defendant's plea of former jeopardy was rejected, and he was
convicted on all counts.
52
The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant should not have been
subjected to the second trial. The Court noted that the facts did not suggest
harassment of the accused through successive prosecutions or deliberate
manipulation of a mistrial request to afford a more favorable opportunity to
convict; nonetheless, the Court found the retrial barred. The prosecutor's
failure to ensure the presence of his witnesses did not amount to manifest
necessity justifying the mistrial.12' Although the Court indicated that in
some situations, presumably those involving unanticipated illness or
disappearances, the absence of a witness might justify mistrial, 22 Downum
was not of that type. The Court concluded that retrial on all the counts was
514. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486.
515. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
516. Id. at 609.
517. See supra text accompanying notes 466-478 (discussing Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600).
518. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
519. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
520. Downum, 372 U.S. at 735.
521. Id. at 736-38.
522. Id. at 737.
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prohibited, without distinguishing the two counts to which the absent
witnesses were crucial from the other four that the government was
reasonably prepared to prove."u
The prosecutor in Illinois v. Somerville 24 was also derelict, but the
Court concluded that retrial following mistrial over the defendant's objection
was not prohibited. After the jury was sworn, the prosecutor realized that
the indictment was fatally defective for failing to include the mental element
of the crime.5" The trial judge concluded that further proceedings under
the indictment would be useless and, therefore, granted the State's motion
for a mistrial over the defendant's objections. The defendant was reindicted,
tried, and convicted.526
The Court began its analysis by quoting a frequently excerpted passage
from Justice Story's opinion in Perez:
"We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of
public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound
discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circum-
stances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the
power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital
cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere
with any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner. But, after all,
they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the
public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this
discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the
Judges, under their oaths of office." 27
The Court collapsed Justice Story's "manifest necessity" or "the ends of
justice" two-pronged standard into a single standard and found "manifest
necessity" for the mistrial because otherwise the "ends of public justice"
would be defeated.528
The ends of justice include both the public's interest in seeing criminal
charges resolved and the judiciary's interest in efficiency. The Court
523. Id.
524. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
525. Id. at 459. The indictment, which charged theft, failed to alleged that the accused
intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property. d.
526. Id. at 459-60.
527. Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)).
528. Id. at 459.
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reasoned that, if involuntary mistrial were not available for fatally defective
indictments, a final resolution would necessarily entail conviction at the first
trial, reversal on appeal, reindictment, retrial, and conviction or acquittal.
The mistrial enabled a swifter resolution of the charge without the
formalistic step of reversal on appeal because of the defective indictment.
The Somerville opinion emphasized both the broad discretion reserved to the
trial judge and the lack of a mechanistic formula for determining manifest
necessity.529
In distinguishing Downum, the Somerville Court observed that in
Downum the prosecution knew prior to jury selection that the key witnesses
were missing and had not been subpoenaed.5 10 However, the Court did not
explain how the prosecutor's pre-jury selection knowledge in Downum was
any different from that in Somerville, in which the prosecutor certainly
should have known prior to jury selection that the indictment was defective.
Nonetheless, the cases can be distinguished. In Downum the prosecutor
began the trial with insufficient evidence to convict. As the Court later
observed in Arizona v. Washington,531 "the strictest scrutiny is appropriate
when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution
evidence, or when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical advantage
over the accused."
532
In Somerville, on the other hand, as in earlier cases that approved
retrial following a involuntary mistrial, there was "a procedural defect [that]
might or would preclude the public from either obtaining an impartial
verdict or keeping a verdict of conviction if its evidence persuaded the
jury.
"5 33
The trial judge's failure to make an explicit finding of manifest
necessity before granting a mistrial is not necessarily fatal to a retrial. In
Arizona v. Washingto5 34 the Court concluded that as long as the record
reflects the judge's reasoning behind granting a mistrial, the judge does not
529. See id. at 462-64.
530. Id. at 464-65.
531. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
532. Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
533. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 468-69 (citing Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199
(1916) (allowing retrial following discharge of the jury because the defendant had not
pleaded to the indictment); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (allowing
retrial following mistrial granted when the judge discovered one of the jurors was
disqualified for having served on the grand jury that had indicted the defendant);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (allowing retrial following mistrial
granted because of possible bias due to a newspaper article indicating that one of the
jurors was a friend of the defendant)).
534. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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need to utter the precise phrase, "manifest necessity. ""
Significantly, Arizona v. Washington introduced a three-tiered sliding
scale of appellate scrutiny, depending upon the grounds on which the trial
court declared the mistrial. As was noted above, strictest scrutiny is
appropriate for cases of prosecutorial manipulation of the trial or other
harassment of the accused.536 At the other end of the spectrum are cases
that conclude with a hung jury.537 In Arizona v. Washington the Court
concluded that the mistrial, which was granted because of potential juror
bias occasioned by prejudicial remarks in defense counsel's opening
statement, fell into a middle area in which the trial judge's exercise of
discretion "is entitled to special respect." ' The trial judge who hears the
improper argument and sees the jurors' reaction is in the best position to
determine whether cautionary instructions would suffice to cure potential
bias.
VII. SENTENCING
A. Multiple Charges; Successive Trials, and Governmental
Appeals of Sentences
The most common double jeopardy sentencing issue concerns the
prohibition against multiple punishments for a single criminal act. The cases
are complicated because the Double Jeopardy Clause generally prohibits
multiple punishments for a single criminal act, but permits multiple
punishments for a single crime in a single prosecution when the legislature
has so provided.539
As previously discussed in Parts III and IV, the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits subsequent prosecutions for the same offense following
acquittal or conviction, except for reprosecution following reversal of a
535. Id. at 516-17.
536. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
537. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509.
538. Id. at 510. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a defendant's retrial
following a mistrial granted after the trial judge dismissed two jurors upon discovering
that one juror was related to the defendant and another juror was related to the State's
chief witness. State v. Gamble, 275 S.C. 492, 272 S.E.2d 796 (1980).
539. E.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (upholding multiple punishments
for a single act of armed robbery by allowing punishment for first degree robbery, which
requires use of a deadly weapon, and also for armed criminal action); State v. Bolden,
303 S.C. 41, 398 S.E.2d 494 (1990) (upholding multiple punishments for armed robbery
and possession of a weapon during a violent crime); State v. Walsh, 300 S.C. 427, 388
S.E.2d 777 (1988) (holding that multiple punishments are not authorized for pointing a
firearm and assault with intent to kill). This issue is developed in detail supra part V(A),
"Multiple Charges in a Single Prosecution."
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conviction on appeal.540 If the defendant is reconvicted on retrial following
reversal of the original conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit a more severe sentence than the sentence originally imposed.54'
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that the defendant receive
credit for punishment served pursuant to the original sentence.
542
In United States v. DiFrancesco,543 one of the most important double
jeopardy sentencing cases,"' the Court concluded that the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause does not prohibit the government from appealing a sentence, or
the appellate court from increasing the sentence, if the legislature has so
provided.545 Sentences are not like charges; an imposed sentence is not an
implied acquittal of a greater sentence. The double jeopardy rules of implied
acquittal do not apply to greater and lesser sentences. 46 The government's
appeal in DiFrancesco did not involve a successive prosecution threat
because the appellate court based its reassessment of the sentence on the trial
record.547 DiFrancesco is particularly significant in light of a number of
jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guideline schemes which provide
for appellate review of sentencing at the instance of either the defendant or
the government.548
540. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Ball is discussed supra text
accompanying note 241. The prohibition on successive prosecutions is discussed supra
part V(B), "Successive Prosecutions."
541. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969). Nevertheless, the Due
Process Clause would prohibit a greater sentence on reconviction motivated by
vindictiveness based on the defendant's having appealed the earlier conviction. The
resentencing judge must justify the more severe sentence by reference to identifiable
conductby the defendant occurring after the original sentencing procedure. Id. at 725-26.
The presumption of vindictiveness is not applicable if the initial conviction was
based on a guilty plea and the reconviction followed a trial. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S.
794 (1989) (overruling Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (a companion case to
Pearce)). Due process and sentencing on reconviction is discussed in 3 LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 12, at 919-21.
542. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 718-19. The Court emphasized that "punishment already
endured [must be] fully subtracted from any new sentence imposed." Id. at 718.
543. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
544. The DiFrancesco opinion contains an extended review of the history, rationale,
and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 126-31.
545. For example, in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-
3576 (1985), Congress provided that the appellate courts may impose a more severe
sentence for "dangerous special offenders."
546. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132-33.
547. Id. at 136.
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In spite of DiFrancesco, the Court in Bullington v. Missour 49
concluded that the government cannot seek the death penalty after reconvic-
tion of a capital offense following remand of an earlier capital conviction in
which the original jury declined to assess capital punishment. The jury made
its sentencing determination in a separate trial-type proceeding in which the
State had the burden to establish aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. Consequently, the sentence of life imprisonment was
equivalent to an implied acquittal for the alternative sentence of death. 5 0
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the Bullington rule
applies to trial-like sentence enhancement proceedings in non-capital cases.
In Lockhart v. Nelson"' the Court expressly declined to consider the
issue. Lower courts are split: some holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes the State from seeking a second sentence enhancement after failing
to establish the required statutory predicate in the first sentencing proceed-
ing; 52 others holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude
the State from seeking such enhancements. 53
When unauthorized multiple punishments have been imposed, what
remedy does the Double Jeopardy Clause require? In Ex parte Lange54
the defendant was sentenced to a fine and imprisonment for an offense
punishable by fine or imprisonment. The Court held that the defendant was
entitled to release from imprisonment because he had already paid the
fine.
555
In re Bradley5 6 involved another defendant sentenced to both fine and
imprisonment under a statute authorizing only fine or imprisonment. While
in prison, the defendant paid the fine. The trial court struck the fine from
the sentence, retained the prison term, and directed the clerk of court to
return the fine. The defendant refused to accept the returned money. The
Court held that the defendant was entitled to be released, stating that
"[s]ince one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been
satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint. "
557
The Court recently revisited this type of question in Jones v.
549. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
550. Id. at 445-46: see infra notes 569-573 and accompanying text.
551. 488 U.S. 33, 37-38 n.6 (1988).
552. E.g., Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 907 (1990).
553. People v. Hunt, 557 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 579 N.E.2d 208
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 432 (1991).
554. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
555. Id. at 178.
556. 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
557. Id. at 52, quoted in Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 383 (1989).
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Thomas.5 8 A trial court gave the defendant consecutive sentences of life
imprisonment for felony murder and fifteen years for the underlying felony
of attempted robbery. The trial court ordered the robbery sentence to be
served first. In an unrelated case, the state supreme court later concluded
that the legislature had not authorized separate sentences for felony murder
and the underlying felony.559 In response, the governor commuted the
defendant's sentence for attempted robbery to time served. The trial court
vacated the conviction and sentence for attempted robbery and resentenced
him on felony murder, crediting the time served for attempted robbery
against the life sentence for felony murder."6 The defendant claimed that
because he had completed, by virtue of the commutation, one of the two
sentences authorized by the legislature, the Double Jeopardy Clause required
his release from serving any part of the other sentence.56
1
The Court disagreed, observing that the primary concern of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that one not be sentenced to a greater punishment than
the legislature authorized. The Court concluded that the defendant was
serving no more than a life sentence, which the legislature had autho-
rized. 562
The double jeopardy problem in Jones stemmed from the fact that the
governor had allowed the defendant to serve out one of the sentences that
the legislature had authorized for his offense. Meanwhile, the trial court
applied the time served on the sentence for attempted robbery to the
sentence for felony murder (just as the court in In re Bradley had attempted
to give Bradley back his fine).
The Jones Court distinguished Lange and Bradley. The Court drew no
more from Lange than "the uncontested proposition that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the
legislature."563 But strict application of the Bradley rule would have
required Jones's release, given that he had already satisfied one of the
authorized sentences for his crime. However, the Court distinguished
Bradley as a case of "true" alternative punishments-fine or imprison-
ment-that the legislature had authorized for a single offense. Surely the
legislature never would have intended that the punishment for an underlying
felony be imposed as an alternative sentence for felony murder.56
558. 491 U.S. 376 (1989).
559. Id. at 378-79 (citing State v. Morgan, 612 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1981); State v. Olds,
603 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1980)).
560. Id. at 378-79.
561. Id. at 382.
562. Id. at 381-82.
563. Id. at 383 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980)).
564. See id. at 384-85.
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Finally, the Jones Court concluded that the trial judge's resentencing
of the defendant to a new life term on the felony murder charge was not the
imposition of an additional sentence, but merely a valid remedy for
improper "'cumulative sentencing imposed in a single trial.'"" Jones's
argument makes more sense in a context of cumulative sentences of fixed
terms of years. However, the Court did not disagree with Justice Scalia's
assertion for the four dissenters that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
a judge who has sentenced an individual to less than the maximum term
from giving that defendant additional punishment."6
B. Capital Sentencing Procedures
1. Federal Cases
As the Court observed in United States v. DiFrancesco,67 the
"conviction of lesser implies acquittal of greater" doctrine has no place in
sentencing. Thus, if a subsequent sentencing proceeding is authorized, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit imposition of a greater sen-
tence. 568 However, in Bullington v. Missouri56 9 the Court concluded that
capital sentencing procedures are different. A defendant convicted of a
capital offense and sentenced to life imprisonment cannot face the death
penalty on reconviction following reversal of his original convictionY.
5 0
The typical sentencing procedure is not like a trial; the prosecution need
not establish particular elements by any standard of proof, and the
sentencing authority has substantial discretion to select a sentence within
legislatively determined boundaries."7 ' By contrast, the capital sentencing
scheme in Bullington was nearly as structured as a trial of the offense. After
finding the defendant guilty of the capital offense, the jury must consider
evidence of various factors in aggravation and mitigation of the conduct.
The jury may sentence the defendant to death only by designating in writing
the factors in aggravation that it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the
565. Id. at 386 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)).
566. Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
567. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
568. Id. at 132-33.
569. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
570. Id. at 446 (refusing to extend the reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
15 (1919)).
571. Id. at 439-40. Sentencing in DiFrancesco was something of an exception to tHe
traditionally informal sentencing procedures. The Government had to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence in a separate sentencing proceeding, that the defendant
was a "dangerous special offender." Then, the judge had to select an appropriate term
of up to 25 years. Id. at 440-41 (citing the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1985)).
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jury must unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the factors
in aggravation warrant the death penalty. If the jury is unable to agree on
capital punishment, the defendant automatically receives a life sentence.57
The Court in Bullington concluded that the sentencing process was
analogous to the determination of guilt or innocence. As in a trial, the jury
had only two options, the hearing was formally structured, and the burden
was placed on the State to establish certain factors beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court held that rejection of the death sentence is the functional
equivalent of an implied acquittal in a trial. Consequently, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited the State from subsequently exposing the
defendant to the death penalty for the same offense when a life sentence had
previously been given. 73
The five-to-four decision in Bullington was reaffirmed by a seven-
justice majority in Arizona v. Rumsey.574 In Arizona, after a jury finds a
defendant guilty of a capital offense, the statutory capital punishment scheme
provides that the trial judge conducts the sentencing proceeding. The judge
must impose capital punishment if at least one aggravating circumstance is
found and if no substantial mitigating circumstances justify leniency.
575
The State's burden of proof is "certainty beyond a reasonable doubt."576
In Rumsey the trial judge found no factors in aggravation, specifically
noting that the "killing for pecuniary gain" factor was inapplicable because
that factor was limited to contract killings. Accordingly, the judge sentenced
the defendant to life imprisonment. The appellate court concluded that the
trial judge had misinterpreted the statutory provision regarding the
aggravating circumstance and that killings for pecuniary gain included
killings in the course of a robbery or burglary. The appellate court reversed
the sentence and remanded for a new capital sentencing proceeding. In the
subsequent sentencing proceeding the trial court found the aggravating
circumstance of a "killing for pecuniary gain" and sentenced the defendant
to death.5"
The Supreme Court concluded that under Bullington the implied
rejection of the death penalty barred its reimposition, even though the initial
sentence of life imprisonment was made possible by the trial court's
erroneous ruling of state law.578 As the Court stated: "'[T]he fact that the
acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous
572. Id. at 432-35.
573. Id. at 444-46.
574. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
575. Id. at 205.
576. Id. at 209.
577. Id. at 205-08.
578. Id. at 211-12 (explicitly declining the State's invitation to overrule Bullington).
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interpretations of governing legal principles'.., affects the accuracy of that
determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'""'
When the initial sentencing proceeding results in a death sentence,
however, the death penalty may be imposed upon a retrial, even if the first
trial court committed substantial error in assessing the initial death sentence.
In Hitchcock v. Dugge' 80 the sentencing court improperly refused to
consider mitigating evidence that was not listed in the capital murder statute.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the sentences. The Court noted,
however, that on remand the death penalty could be imposed.
581
Even if the trial court initially imposed the death sentence on the basis
of an aggravating circumstance, which the appellate court found not to exist,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not foreclose subsequent imposition of
capital punishment.5" In Poland v. Arizona583 the trial court concluded,
as in Rumsey, that the aggravating factor of "a killing for pecuniary gain"
was applicable only to contract killings. But the Poland Court found another
factor in aggravation-the killing was in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner-and sentenced the defendant to death. The appellate court
found the evidence insufficient to support the cruelty factor, but ruled that
the "killing for pecuniary gain" could be considered upon resentencing. On
remand, the defendant was reconvicted of the capital offense, and the death
sentence was again imposed, this time on the basis of both aggravating
factors. The appellate court again found insufficient evidence to support the
cruelty factor, but sustained the death sentence on the basis that the killing
was for pecuniary gain."'
The Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing this case from Bullington
and Rumsey on the ground that the initial life sentence in the former cases
amounted to an implied rejection of the death sentence. In Poland, however,
the trial court initially rendered a death sentence, but neither the trial court
nor the appellate court ever concluded during either the first or second
hearing that the State had failed to prove that the death penalty was
appropriate. 5
2. South Carolina Cases
The South Carolina Supreme Court has considered several double
579. Id. at 211 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978)).
580. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
581. Id. at 398-99.
582. See Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
583. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
584. Id. at 149-51.
585. Id. at 155-57.
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jeopardy issues related to capital punishment. Unfortunately, however, the
court sometimes treats the issues in a conclusory fashion. For example, in
State v. Spann'86 the court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did
not prohibit imposing a sentence for burglary and using the burglary as a
factor in aggravation to support a death penalty for murder.5  The court
did not explicitly consider whether the legislature had intended that
result. 88 Also unclear in Spann is whether the murder conviction was
based on a felony murder theory with the burglary as the underlying felony,
or on a traditional malice theory independent of the burglary.5 89
Relying on Bullington, the court in State v. Gilber 90 concluded that
no double jeopardy violation occurred by submitting evidence of a factor in
aggravation to a second sentencing jury, because the first jury made no
finding on that particular factor. 91 The first sentencing jury found one of
the submitted factors in aggravation and rendered a death sentence. The
second sentencing jury found both factors in aggravation and also rendered
a death sentence. The Gilbert majority found that the first jury's failure to
make a finding on both of the factors in aggravation was not an implied
acquittal of the unfound factor.5" However, Justice Harwell, in dissent,
concluded that the jury's failure to make a finding established reasonable
doubt about the factor's existence.59
Subsequent cases have upheld, without dissent, the practice of
submitting to a second sentencing jury factors to which the earlier senten-
cing jury had been exposed, but of which that jury made no fimding."
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also concluded that a trial
court's failure to submit a factor in aggravation to a jury when submission
is not requested by the State does not amount to a ruling that the evidence
could not support the presence of the factor. Therefore, submitting the factor
586. 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 947 (1984).
587. Id. at 403, 308 S.E.2d at 520.
588. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), discussed supra notes 286-289 and
accompanying text.
589. A state appellate court's conclusion that the legislature had not intended separate
penalties for felony murder and the underlying felony led to the double jeopardy
difficulties in Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989), discussed supra notes 558-566 and
accompanying text.
590. 277 S.C. 53, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
591. Id. at 58-59, 283 S.E.2d at 181-82.
592. Id. at 60, 283 S.E.2d at 182.
593. Id. at 60-63, 283 S.E.2d at 182-84 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
594. E.g., State v. Johnson, 306 S.C. 119, 134, 410 S.E.2d 547, 556 (1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1691 (1992); State v. Elmore, 286 S.C. 70, 74, 332 S.E.2d 762, 764
(1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1101 (1986).
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in aggravation to a jury at a subsequent capital punishment proceeding is not
foreclosed. 5
VIII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND GUILTY PLEAS
A. Procedural Issues
1. Waiver
The protection against double jeopardy can be waived, as can other
constitutional rights. 96 However, surprisingly little definitive authority
exists about the circumstances under which one is held to have waived a
double jeopardy claim. Courts distinguish between claims concerning
successive prosecutions and those concerning multiple counts in a single
trial, but the United States courts of appeals are split about when waiver will
be found."9
Further complicating the issue, the Supreme Court has offered limited
guidance. The Court has concluded that opposing the government's motion
to consolidate charges into a single trial amounts to an implied waiver of the
protection against successive prosecutions. 9 In addition, a double
595. See State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 18, 313 S.E.2d 619, 629, cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1265 (1984). Section 16-3-20(c) of the South Carolina Code requires the trial judge to
submit to the jury any statutory aggravating circumstances "which may be supported by
the evidence." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991). The
Plath court concluded, however, that this code provision does not authorize the court to
submit factors in aggravation not submitted by the State. Plath, 281 S.C. at 18, 313
S.E.2d at 629.
596. The classic definition of waiver for constitutional rights "is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
597. For example the Fifth Circuit has concluded that failure to object during trial
waives a double jeopardy claim against successive prosecutions, Grogan v. United States,
394 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1967), but not a claim against multiple charges in a single
trial, United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1343 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 349 (1991). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that a claim against
multiple charges is waived if not made prior to trial, but that a claim against being
sentenced on those charges is not waived. United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715,
721-22 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
Some courts have held that a claim against successive prosecutions will be deemed
waived if not asserted prior to trial, United States v. Milhin, 702 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir.
1983), or at trial, United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (1 lth Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985). On the other hand, the First Circuit has held that a claim
against successive prosecutions is not waived even if not made at trial. United States v.
Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
Most of these cases, as well as others, are cited in Clauson, supra note 12, at 1330
nn.1562-63.
598. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1977).
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jeopardy claim may be waived through a plea bargain, even if the plea
bargain did not explicitly refer to double jeopardy."'
Since United States v. Ball w the Court has recognized the well-
established rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not ordinarily
preclude retrial of a defendant who has successfully appealed a convic-
tion.601 The Ball rule is sometimes explained by a continuing-jeopardy
theory and sometimes by a waiver theory.' However, because a defend-
ant convicted of a lesser included offense of the offense charged is impliedly
acquitted of the greater offense, his appeal of the conviction for the lesser
included offense does not waive his double jeopardy protection against
reprosecution for the greater offense.6 3
In Burks v. United States' the defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal was denied. He was convicted, and his motion for a new trial
because of insufficient evidence was denied. The appellate court reversed the
conviction for insufficient evidence and remanded with instructions either to
grant a new trial or to enter a directed verdict of acquittal.' The Supreme
Court modified the order, concluding that the appellate court's reversal for
insufficient evidence amounted to an acquittal and, thus, precluded
reprosecution. The Court also determined that the defendant had not waived
his double jeopardy protection by a motion for a new trial. 
6°
A defendant who moves for a mistrial after jeopardy has attached is
ordinarily subject to reprosecution without the government's having to
establish a manifest necessity for the granting of the mistrialA' A defend-
ant typically moves for a mistrial because of prosecutorial or judicial error
that is perceived hopelessly to prejudice the defendant's prospects for
acquittal. If the traditional standard of waiver-knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary6 8-were applied to the defendant's decision, the motion for
599. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987); see infra notes 679-684 and
accompanying text.
600. 163 U.S. 662 (1898).
601. Id. at 671-72. Reprosecution is precluded, however, if the appellate court
reversed the conviction because of insufficient evidence. Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1 (1978), discussed supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
602. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
603. Id. at 191-98.
604. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
605. Id. at 3-4.
606. Id. at 17.
607. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), discussed supra notes 466-478 and
accompanying text. The exception to this rule involves situations in which the defendant
was goaded by the prosecution into moving for the mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667 (1982), discussed supra notes 479489 and accompanying text.
608. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), cited in Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609 n.ll.
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mistrial might be seen as involuntary and, therefore, not as a waiver of the
Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against reprosecution. A defendant
confronted with such error faces a "Hobson's choice" between continuing
a trial tainted by the error or giving up his right to resolution by the first
jury. Acknowledging this dilemma, the Dinitz Court concluded that
traditional concepts of waiver have little relevance in light of the importance
of the defendant's right to retain primary control over the course of the
litigation in the event of such error.'
The defendant's motion for voluntary mistrial, which does not preclude
reprosecution, has been characterized as "a deliberate election on his part
to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before
the first trier of fact."610 A defendant's post-jeopardy motion to dismiss
based on reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence has been similarly
characterized and does not preclude the government's appeal of the dismissal
with the aim of reprosecution. 61' Defense motions for mistrial and dismiss-
al are made to take the decision on guilt or innocence away from the trier
of fact. When either motion is granted, the defendant has not been
"deprived" of his right to go to the first jury; therefore, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar reprosecution.1 2
2. Burden of Proof
When a defendant makes a colorable claim of double jeopardy, the
government has the burden of establishing that the prosecution is not for the
same offense of which the defendant was previously placed in jeopardy.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly so held, it has observed
that
[a]ll nine federal Circuits which have addressed the issue have held that
"when a defendant puts double jeopardy in issue with a non-frivolous
showing that an indictment charges him with an offense for which he
was formerly placed in jeopardy, the burden shifts to the government to
establish that there were in fact two separate offenses."
613
609. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609.
610. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978).
611. Id. at 101. The dismissal in Scott was based on prejudicial pre-indictment delay.
Id. at 84.
612. Id. at 100.
613. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 522 n.14 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1192 (4th Cir. 1988)), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113
S. Ct. 2849 (1993); accord, State v. Amerson, 428 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. 1993); State v.
Dowey, 307 S.C. 69, 413 S.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1992).
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The government's burden is by a preponderance of the evidence. 614
The Court has spoken more directly concerning the burden of proof
after the trial judge has declared an involuntary mistrial: "[T]he prosecutor
must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the
double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must
demonstrate 'manifest necessity' for any mistrial declared over the objection
of the defendant. "615
The manifest-necessity standard is inapplicable if the defendant
requested or consented to the granting of the mistrial.616 However, in
those situations in which the defendant was goaded into requesting a mistrial
by deliberate prosecutorial misconduct, if the defendant first establishes





A defendant who is convicted after a trial court rejects his pretrial claim
of double jeopardy is denied an important part of the protection of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, even if the initial double jeopardy claim prompts
the appellate court to reverse and remand with directions to dismiss.
[T]he rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy
Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double
jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence. To
be sure, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against being
twice convicted for the same crime, and that aspect of the right can be
fully vindicated on an appeal following final judgment, as the Govern-
ment suggests. However, this Court has long recognized that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against more than being subjected
to double punishments. It is a guarantee against being twice put to trial
for the same offense.
618
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against exposure to double jeopardy,
to being forced to "run the gauntlet" a second time. Even if the defendant
is acquitted, or is convicted but has his double jeopardy claim vindicated on
614. Ragins, 840 F.2d at 1192.
615. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
616. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); see supra notes 466-478 and
accompanying text.
617. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring),
discussed supra notes 479-489 and accompanying text.
618. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
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appeal, he has been forced to endure the embarrassment, expense, and
anxiety of an inappropriate second trial-precisely what the Double Jeopardy
Clause guards against.
Consequently, in Abney v. United States619 the Court concluded that
rejection of a claim of double jeopardy falls within an exception to the final
judgment rule so that an interlocutory appeal can be taken. Only by
immediate appeal may the second trial be avoided and the double jeopardy
right be fully vindicated. In spite of the dictum quoted above concerning the
Double Jeopardy Clause, Abney is a statutory decision construing federal
law; therefore, the decision is not binding on the states as part of the law of
double jeopardy. 2'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has disagreed with the rationale of
Abney; thus, in South Carolina, "an order denying a double jeopardy claim
is not immediately appealable." 62 In State v. Miller" the court empha-
sized that the right to appeal in South Carolina is conferred by statute and
that, under the applicable statutory provision, a criminal defendant cannot
appeal until he has been sentenced. 6' Although not articulated in Miller,
the apparent rationale for the rule against interlocutory appeals is to promote
judicial efficiency and to avoid unnecessary delay of the prosecution. 6 4
Whether denying an interlocutory appeal of the rejection of a double
jeopardy claim promotes judicial efficiency is dubious. A state court's denial
of the claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action prior to trial in
the state court.6' Whether denying interlocutory appeals is necessary in
order to avoid frivolous, dilatory tactics by the defendant is also ques-
tionable. In the federal system, after denial of the defendant's motion to
dismiss for double jeopardy, a trial may proceed pending appeal of the trial
court's finding that the claim is frivolous.626 A number of states have
619. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
620. The Abney Court, construing the "final decision" provision of the jurisdictional
statute for the federal courts of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), concluded that pretrial
rejection of a double jeopardy claim falls within the collateral order exception to the
final-judgment rule announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949). Abney, 431 U.S. at 656-62. The collateral-order exception of Abney was
reaffirned in Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984).
621. State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 426, 427, 346 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1986). In South
Carolina the State probably could appeal the granting of a defendant's pretrial motion to
dismiss for double jeopardy. See infra note 660 and accompanying text.
622. 289 S.C. 426, 346 S.E.2d 705 (1986).
623. Id. at 427, 346 S.E.2d at 706 (construing S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330 (Law. Co-
op. 1976)).
624. See State v. Burbage, 51 S.C. 284, 287, 28 S.E. 937, 938 (1898).
625. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 501 (1978).
626. E.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 491
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adopted similar procedures that allow interlocutory appeals of pretrial
denials of nonfrivolous double jeopardy claims.627
b. Appeals by the Government
The common- law prohibits appeals by the government absent express
statutory authorization.628 As the Supreme Court observed a century ago,
"it is settled by an overwhelming weight of American authority, that the
State has no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express
statutes."629 Consequently, given the limited federal statutory authorization
for appeals by the government, the Court has had few opportunities to
consider the constitutional limitations on governmental appeals. 630
Currently, however, the Criminal Appeals Act authorizes federal
appeals of orders dismissing indictments or granting new trials, "except that
no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits further prosecution. "631 The legislative history of the
Act evinces an intent "to extend the Government's appeal rights to the
constitutional limits. "632
In determining the constitutional limitations on the government's right
to appeal, the Court has emphasized that a primary purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to protect one who has been acquitted from being tried
again for the same offense. "Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the
history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict of
acquittal. . . could not be reviewed, without putting [a defendant] twice in
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution. '"633 Consequently, the
government may not appeal a judgment of acquittal following the discharge
U.S. 907 (1989). For additional authority, see Clauson, supra note 12, at 1332 nn.1571-
73 and accompanying text.
627. E.g., Patterson v. State, 287 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 1982); Commonwealth v. Brady, 508
A.2d 286 (Pa. 1986); Trimboli v. MacLean, 735 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
628. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). This is not the view of the South
Carolina Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Holliday, 255 S.C. 142, 177 S.E.2d 541
(1970).
629. Sanges, 144 U.S. at 312.
630. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975). Earlier in its opinion,
the Wilson Court discussed early appellate statutes and their interpretations. Id. at 336-
37.
631. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988). The statute was passed as Title m of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 95-644, 84 Stat. 1890.
632. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 338.
633. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
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of a deadlocked jury, because a successful appeal would necessitate
retrial. 34
The same result obtains both when the court grants a demurrer at the
end of the government's case because of insufficient evidence," 5 and when
the court enters a judgment of acquittal even though based on an erroneous
evidentiary ruling improperly excluding important governmental evi-
dence. 36 A dismissal at the end of all the evidence for prejudicial pre-
indictment delay would not be tantamount to an acquittal and could not be
appealed because the defendant was the party that sought an end to the trial
without a jury's determination on guilt or innocence. 6 '
Appeal is permitted, however, in the case of a dismissal for prejudicial
pre-indictment delay following the jury's guilty verdict.638 If the govern-
ment succeeds on appeal, additional trial court proceedings are not
necessary. The court can enter a judgment of guilty based on the jury's
original verdict, and the defendant would not be subjected to successive
prosecutions for the same offense.639
In South Carolina the State's right of appeal is defined by judicial
decision rather than by statute. 6" 0 Moreover, the right extends to an order
quashing an indictment," a judgment "reversing or setting aside a
conviction on purely legal grounds," 2 and an order granting a new trial
if based on error of law or manifest abuse of discretion. 6"
State v. Holliday' 4 is an example of the second type of case. In
Holliday the State appealed a circuit court's decision that reversed a
conviction in magistrate's court on the grounds that an illegal arrest vitiated
the conviction.' 5 Holliday is consistent with United States v. Wilson 6
because the State's success resulted in an order affirming the original
conviction in the magistrate's court and did not expose the defendant to
another trial.
634. Id. at 570. Retrial following a mistrial granted because of a deadlocked jury is
generally permissible. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
accompanying text.
635. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
636. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978).
637. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978).
638. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
639. Id. at 353.
640. State v. Holliday, 255 S.C. 142, 144, 177 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1970).
641. State v. Kirkland, 282 S.C. 14, 317 S.E.2d 444 (1984).
642. Holliday, 255 S.C. at 145, 177 S.E.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
643. State v. Johnson, 123 S.C. 50, 115 S.E. 748 (1923).
644. 255 S.C. 142, 177 S.E.2d 541 (1970).
645. Id. at 145-147, 177 S.E.2d at 543.
646. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
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Since the early nineteenth century, it has been well settled in South
Carolina that the State cannot appeal an acquittal, 7 even if the acquittal
is predicated on erroneous rulings of law. 48 In State v. Dasherm49 the
trial judge disagreed with the jury's assessment of the evidence and entered
a verdict of not guilty following the jury's verdict of guilty. The supreme
court granted the State's appeal and characterized the judge's action as an
error of law because a trial judge lacks authority to weigh the evidence 50
The court reinstated the jury's guilty verdict and remanded for sentenc-
ing.65 Two justices in Dasher characterized the result below as an
acquittal from which the State has no authority to appeal.652
Several South Carolina cases contain dicta suggesting that an acquittal
procured through fraud would be a nullity and would not bar
reprosecution.6 3 However, no reported cases involve acquittals procured
through fraud. In State v. Johnson 4 the court entertained the State's
appeal of an acquittalA55 but ultimately rejected on the merits the State's
contention that the acquittal was fraudulently procured. 1
6
In State v. McKnight 7 the court held that the State can take an
interlocutory appeal from "[a] pre-trial order granting the suppression of
evidence which significantly impairs the prosecution of a criminal
case."" The court relied on a statutory provision conferring appellate
jurisdiction from "[a]n order affecting a substantial right made in an action
when such order . . . in effect determines the action and prevents a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the
action."" Allowing the interlocutory appeal serves the State's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws because the suppression order, even if erroneous,
could result in an acquittal from which the State could not appeal. An
interlocutory appeal allows the appellate court to correct any erroneous
order of suppression. The court's reasoning in McKnight would also allow
the State to appeal other pretrial rulings adverse to the State, including the
647. State v. Wright, 3 S.C. (2 Tread.) 517 (1814).
648. State v. Gathers, 15 S.C. 370 (1881).
649. 278 S.C. 395, 297 S.E.2d 414 (1982).
650. Id. at 400, 297 S.E.2d at 416-17.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 400, 297 S.E.2d at 417 (Ness, J., dissenting).
653. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 248 S.C. 153, 159, 149 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1966);
State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 189, 66 S.E.2d 701, 706 (1951).
654. 248 S.C. 153, 149 S.E.2d 348 (1966).
655. Id. at 159, 149 S.E.2d at 350.
656. Id. at 164, 149 S.E.2d at 353.
657. 287 S.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 208 (1985).
658. Id. at 168, 337 S.E.2d at 209.
659. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss because of double jeopar-
dy.6
4. Remedy
In subsequent-prosecution cases, the remedy for a double jeopardy
violation is to prohibit the jeopardy-barred trial.66' In multiple-prosecution
cases, the remedy is reversal of the jeopardy-barred conviction. 662 Finding
an appropriate remedy becomes complicated when some, but not all, of the
charges are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
For example, in Green v. United States 66 the defendant was original-
ly charged with first degree murder, but found guilty of murder in the
second degree. After the conviction was reversed, the defendant was
reprosecuted and convicted of first degree murder. The Court concluded that
the initial jury's silence on murder in the first degree was an implied
acquittal of that charge; therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded
retrial.' However, the Court did not elaborate on an appropriate remedy
and remained silent about the conviction for second degree murder.
Reprosecution and conviction on the second degree charge was not
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.' But, could the lower court
merely reinstate the second degree murder conviction in light of the second
jury's guilty verdict of the greater offense of first degree murder? Defense
strategy in a second degree murder trial might be considerably different
from that in a first degree murder trial. Therefore, it does not necessarily
follow that a jury which convicted of second degree murder when instructed
on first degree murder would inevitably convict on second degree murder
in the absence of the greater charge.
In Price v. Georgia the Court first gave more detailed attention to
the remedy issue. The defendant in Price was originally charged with
murder, but was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
660. The defendant is not allowed an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's interest in
vindicating Fourth Amendment rights can be served adequately through appeal of denial
of a suppression motion following conviction. However, a lack of access to interlocutory
appeal of the denial of a double jeopardy dismissal motion would appear to frustrate the
basic purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra notes 618-627 and accompany-
ing text.
661. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
662. E.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
663. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
664. Id. at 198. The doctrine of implied acquittal is discussed supra notes 136-145 and
accompanying text.
665. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
666. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
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After he successfully appealed, he was again tried for murder and again
convicted of manslaughter. Retrial on the murder charge violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in Green, but the retrial for manslaughter
was permissible under Ball. Nonetheless, the Court unanimously reversed
the second manslaughter conviction because of concern that the presence of
the unconstitutional murder charge prompted a compromise verdict. 67 The
case was remanded for a determination of whether state law permitted a
third trial for manslaughter. 8
In Morris v. Matthews669 the Court refined Price, noting that Price
did not mandate automatic retrial whenever one is convicted of a lesser
included offense of a jeopardy-barred charge. Reversal of the conviction on
the lesser charge depends upon the likelihood that the conviction on the
lesser charge was influenced by the trial on the greater. "[T]he charge of the
greater offense for which the jury was unwilling to convict also made the
jury less willing to consider the defendant's innocence on the lesser
charge."670
The defendant in Matthews was found guilty of a jeopardy-barred
offense. The Court concluded that reduction by an appellate court to a
conviction for a nonjeopardy-barred lesser included offense was an adequate
remedy unless the defendant could "demonstrate a reasonable probability
that he would not have been convicted of the nonjeopardy-barred offense
absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred offense.""67 The Court reasoned
that, because the jury necessarily found all elements of the lesser included
offense when it found him guilty of the greater offense, the burden should
shift to the defendant to establish a "reasonable probability" of preju-
dice.672
B. Guilty Pleas
In Menna v. New York673 the Supreme Court held, without dissent,
that a guilty plea does not per se waive a double jeopardy claim. While a
guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt and waives constitutional claims
related to the establishment of guilt, the plea does not waive constitutional
667. Price, 398 U.S. at 331.
668. Id. at 332.
669. 475 U.S. 237 (1986).
670. Id. at 245.
671. Id. at 246-47. The defendant's conviction of the jeopardy-barred offense of
aggravated murder had been reduced by a state appellate court to the nonjeopardy-barred
offense of murder.
672. Id. The Court rejected the lower court's standard of a "reasonable possibility"
of prejudice as not being "sufficiently demanding." Id. at 247.
673. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
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claims against the right of the court to convict regardless of guilt. 674
Relying on a footnote observation in Menna, the Court in United States
v. Broce67s limited the Menna rule to situations in which the double
jeopardy defect is apparent on the face of the record.676 The indictment in
Menna duplicated the earlier charges of which the defendant had already
been convicted. By contrast, the Broce indictment did not indicate that the
two alleged conspiracies were part of a single overarching conspiracy to
engage in multiple acts of misconduct.
677
The Broce Court did not find that the defendants had waived their
double jeopardy claim. Indeed, the Court could not have so held because the
defendants' original attorney swore that he had never discussed the double
jeopardy issue with them. Instead, the Court observed that particular
defenses can be irretrievably lost without a conscious waiver. Accordingly,
the Court held that the defendants had relinquished their double jeopardy
claim.678
In Ricketts v. Adamson679 the Court held that a double jeopardy claim
can be waived by a plea bargain and that a particular claim was waived even
though the agreement did not explicitly mention double jeopardy. 6W The
defendant in Adamson was charged with first degree murder, but was
allowed to plead guilty to second degree murder, with a specified sentence,
in exchange for agreeing to testify against other persons allegedly involved
in the murder. The agreement provided that in the event of the defendant's
failure to testify "'this entire agreement is null and void and the original
charge will be automatically reinstated'" and "'the parties shall be returned
to the position they were in before this agreement. "681
The trial court accepted the defendant's plea, and he testified against the
others. The other defendants were convicted of first degree murder.
However, following reversal of their convictions on appeal, the defendant
refused to testify at their retrial. The court vacated the defendant's second
674. Id. at 63 n.2. The Menna Court relied on Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974), in which the Court held that a guilty plea did not waive a due process challenge
to the State's prosecuting that particular charge.
675. 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
676. Id. at 575 ("'We do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived.
We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that-judged on
its face-the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.'") (quoting
Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2).
677. Id. at 575-76.
678. Id. at 572-74. Waiver requires a conscious awareness of what is waived, but
apparently relinquishment does not.
679. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
680. Id. at 9-10.
681. Id. at 9.
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degree murder conviction and tried him on the original indictment. The
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.6" The Supreme Court
concluded that by the express terms of the agreement the defendant's refusal
to testify negated the bargain, placing him back in the original position
before the bargain was entered, at which point he had no double jeopardy
claim.
683
The Adamson Court held that the defendant waived his double jeopardy
claim that his conviction of second degree murder, based on his guilty plea,
precluded the subsequent charge of first degree murder, the former being a
lesser included offense of the latter. Ordinarily, this would be a valid claim
to the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against successive prosecution
for the same offense. 61 But, when the defendant violated his plea agree-
ment, the State argued that the plea was accepted over the State's objection
because the State's consent was conditional on the defendant's testimony.
The situation in Adamson invokes the rule of Ohio v. Johnson:685
When one is charged with greater and lesser included offenses in a single
indictment and enters a plea of guilty to the lesser offense over the State's
objection, the State may continue to prosecute the greater offense charged
in that indictment. In Johnson the defendant was charged with murder,
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft. Over the
State's objection, the trial court accepted the defendant's guilty pleas to
involuntary manslaughter and grand theft-lesser included offenses of
murder and aggravated robbery, respectively-and dismissed the greater
offenses as barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 616
Given the state court's decision that the legislature did not intend
multiple punishment for the greater and lesser included offenses, the
Johnson Court agreed that the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude
punishment for all the offenses. However, the ban on multiple punishments
would not stop the State from prosecuting the defendant for the greater
offenses. Only if the defendant were convicted of the greater offenses would
the court have to address the multiple-punishment issue. 6' Because all the
offenses were charged in a single indictment, and because the State tried to
establish them all in a single proceeding, the ban on successive prosecutions
was no bar to the State's proceeding on the greater offenses.6 8
682. Id. at 7.
683. Id. at 10.
684. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977), discussed supra notes 301-306
and accompanying text.
685. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
686. Id. at 494.
687. Id. at 499-500.
688. Id. at 502.
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In Kelly v. State,68 9 decided after Menna but before Broce and
Adamson, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a defendant's plea of
guilty waived what would have otherwise been a valid double jeopardy
claim. 6" The defendant was indicted for armed robbery, robbery, and
grand larceny in connection with a single criminal transaction, but was tried
only for armed robbery and was acquitted. He subsequently entered a plea
of guilty to grand larceny in return for the solicitor's promise to drop
unrelated charges.69' As was true in Menna, but unlike Broce, the double
jeopardy violation in Kelly was clear on the face of the record. Nonetheless,
the court found that the defendant made a "'conscious and calculated
decision' to accept the State's offer and waive appellant's double jeopardy
claim. "692
It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits retrial of
one whose conviction is overturned on appeal.6" This result is not altered
by the fact that the prior conviction was based on a guilty plea coerced by
the trial judge's comments.6' Reversal of such a conviction is not signifi-
cantly different from a conviction reversed because of an inadmissible
coerced confession.695 Had the defendant moved for a mistrial instead of
changing his plea to guilty, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not have
precluded his retrial.
696
A guilty plea may be vitiated by defense counsel's lack of familiarity
with the law of double jeopardy. In Jivers v. State6 7 the defendant pleaded
guilty to a criminal domestic violence charge. Subsequently, he also entered
a guilty plea to assault and battery with intent to kill, based on the same
incident. Counsel, apparently relying on the Blockburger test for multiple
prosecutions, had advised the defendant that he had no valid double jeopardy
claim. 69 Counsel's unfamiliarity with the same-conduct defimition of same
offense caused the court to conclude that his representation was ineffective
689. 274 S.C. 613, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980).
690. Id. at 615-16, 266 S.E.2d at 418. The Kelly court did not refer to Menna.
691. Id. at 614, 266 S.E.2d at 418.
692. Id. at 615-16, 266 S.E.2d at 418. Kelly thus anticipated the Court's holding in
Adamson.
693. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
694. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
695. Id. at 466-67.
696. Id. at 467. Tateo, of course, predated Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982),
in which the Court concluded that a defendant deliberately goaded by the prosecutor into
moving for a mistrial could not be retried. See supra text accompanying note 480. There
is nothing in the Tateo Court's opinion to suggest that the trial judge's comments were
so motivated.
697. 304 S.C. 556, 406 S.E.2d 154 (1991).
698. Id. at 558, 406 S.E.2d at 156.
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and that the defendant was entitled to relief from the second conviction. 6
IX. CONCLUSION
The decisional law of double jeopardy seems even more entangled than
when then Justice Rehnquist compared it to the Sargasso Sea a dozen years
ago." ° Additionally, these waters have become notably turbulent with the
recent five-to-four overruling of a major precedent hardly three years old.
When, in United States v. Dixon,"' the Court rejected the same-conduct
test of Grady v. Corbin,702 it left confusion in its wake. The five-justice
majority in Dixon fractured three-to-two on how the same-elements test of
Blockburger v. United States703 should be applied to resolve the double
jeopardy dilemma of successive prosecutions for a single act. 7 4
The different destinations reached by the majority and the dissenters in
Dixon are a function of the "judicial navigators'" 7 5 different uses of the
instrument of precedent. Focusing on what he perceived to be the precise
holdings of earlier cases, Justice Scalia found no precedential support for
Grady's same-conduct test." Justice Souter not only found support for
Grady in the holdings of these cases, but, more importantly, looked to
precedent to discover the historical purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Souter found that a "central purpose" of the Clause is to avoid the various
costs of successive prosecution for the same offense, including the
opportunity for the State to rehearse its proof and increase the risk of
convicting innocent persons. Souter then argued that the same-conduct test
was essential to serve that purpose.7"
699. Id. at 560, 406 S.E.2d at 157. Although Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990),
overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), had not been decided at
the time of the deficient advice, the South Carolina Supreme Court had already
responded to the Supreme Court's pointed dictum in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410
(1980), and had adopted the same-conduct test for same offense. See State v. Carter, 291
S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987); State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26
(1986).
The Jivers court rejected the State's guilty plea waiver argument, distinguishing
Kelly v. State, 274 S.C. 613, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980), because of defense counsel's
competent representation in Kelly. Jivers, 304 S.C. at 560, 406 S.E.2d at 157.
700. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
701. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
702. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849.
703. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
704. See supra notes 387-397 and accompanying text.
705. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343.
706. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-64.
707. Id. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The next task for the Court in this immediate area will be to determine
how to apply Blockburger to resolve successive prosecution cases. Should
the earlier offense be defined in a generic sense, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued, 708 or with regard to the precise crime as actually prosecuted, as
Justice Scalia maintained?
71
The author submits that neither this nor any other double jeopardy issue
will be resolved in such a way as to comprehensively smooth these troubled
waters unless the entire Court can focus on the underlying purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, as Justice Souter did in Dixon.
708. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
709. Id. at 2857-58.
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